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In  response  to shortages  in  public  budgets  for government  health  services,  many  developing  countries  around the
world have  adopted  formal  or informal  systems of user fees  for health  care.  In  most countries  user  fee proceeds
seldom represent  more  than  15  percent of total  costs in hospitals  and health  centers,  but they tend to account for a
significant  share  of the resources  required  to pay  for non-personnel  costs.  The problem  with user  fees  is that  the
lack of provisions to confer partial  or full waivers to the poor often results in  inequity in access to medical  care.  The
dilemma, then,  is how to make  a much needed  system of user fees compatible with the goal of preserving  equitable
access  to services.  Different countries  have tried different  approaches.  Those  which have carefully designed  and
implemented  waiver  systems  (e.g.,  Thailand  and  Indonesia)  have  had  much  greater  success  in terms  of benefits
incidence  than countries  that  have improvised  such  systems (Ghana,  Kenya,  Zimbabwe).  Key to the success  of a
waiver  system  is  its  financing.  Systems  that  compensate  providers  for  the  revenue  forgone  from  granting
exemptions  (Thailand,  Indonesia,  and Cambodia)  have been more  successful than those who expect the provider to
absorb  the cost of exemptions  (Kenya).  Where waiver systems exist, performance  will  improve with the timeliness
of the reimbursement.  Other  success  factors include  the widespread  dissemination  of information among potential
beneficiaries  about waiver availability and procedures; the awarding of financial  support to poor patients for non-fee
costs of care,  such as food and transportation  (as in Cambodia);  and the existence  of clear criteria for the granting of
waivers,  thereby reducing  confusion  and  ambiguity  among those  responsible  for managing  the  system and  among
potential  recipients.  Those  facing  the  task of adopting  a  system  of waivers  face  multiple  design  options.  These
include the  following,  among others:  should  exemptions  be granted to  whole groups  or on the basis of individual
targeting (the review  finds that most systems  are based on the latter)?  Should waivers  or exemptions be permanent
or temporary?  How  frequently should  eligibility be reassessed?  Should waiver eligibility be determined  ex-ante,  in
the  household,  or when  individuals  seek care  in the  facility?  The review  examines  various  approaches  taken  by
countries, but assessing their relative practical merits is difficult, as the evidence is scattered and mixed.
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x1  User fees for health services: concepts
1.1  Introduction
Following a dramatic  rise  in living standards over the last decades, extreme  poverty -defined as living on
less than  $1 per day- declined  only slowly in developing countries during the  1990s, and the number of
poor people remained roughly constant as the population  increased.  Poverty has been rapidly rising in
Europe and Central Asia, and remains on the increase  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. In Asia, where most of the
world's poor live, the proportion of people living in poverty had shown sharp declines over the past two
decades,  but the recent crisis has slowed progress (World Bank,  2001 a).  International  agencies  are
putting poverty on the forefront of their agendas. At the United Nations'  International  Millennium
Summit a declaration  was issued containing main  development goals and targets. Foremost is the
Summit's commitment to reduce to half the proportion of people whose  income  is less than $1 a day.
The world community is increasingly  concerned about ways to combat poverty and to construct social
safety nets that help the poor to get out of poverty while preventing the near poor from falling into it.  Ill
health  is related to poverty and it is no coincidence that 4 out of the  18 development targets in the
Millennium  declaration are directly related to health.  In  its poverty reduction  strategy sourcebook, the
World Bank states: "poverty is both a consequence  and a cause of ill health".'  Poor people often lack the
financial  resources to pay for some health services and ill health can undermine a household's ability to
cope financially.  In many developing countries formal or informal  user fees for health services are
widespread  and tend to account for a significant share of the financing for non-personnel  costs.  Thus,
health  systems in developing countries have come to rely on user fees.  Yet where there is a lack of
provisions to confer partial or full waivers to the poor user fees  may lead to inequity  in access to medical
care.  The dilemma, then, is how to make a much needed system of user fees compatible with the goal of
preserving  equitable access to services.  Hence the interest in analyzing different mechanisms to mitigate
the impact of user fees on access to health services by the poor.
This paper is devoted to an analysis of this issue.  Chapter I examines the consequences of user fees on
the poor.  Chapter 2 discusses  at the conceptual  level ways of protecting the poor when user fees are in
place.  Chapter 3 presents detailed case studies from  seven developing countries with poor protection
mechanisms  in health.  To conclude, Chapter 4 offers lessons learned and best practices.
The remainder of this chapter is organized  as follows.  Section  1.2 briefly provides a historical
perspective on the emergence of user fees for health care  in developing countries.  Section  1.3 reviews the
arguments found in the theoretical and empirical  literature in favor and against user fees in health care.
These two sections introduce the role of waivers and exemptions  in the context of health financing.
Section  1.3 defines equity in health.  Section discusses the economic rationale for the commonly used
protection  mechanisms of waivers and exemptions.
1.2  The  emergence  of user fees
Although there is widespread recognition of the role that good health plays in human development, not all
governments have had the ability or willingness to increase spending  in the health sector, or to improve
spending efficiency.  Over the past two decades,  as government budgets for the social sectors have failed
See World Bank  2001  Poverty Reduction and the Health Sector, The Nutrition and Population Network's  Chapter in  the
World Bank's  Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook
1. User Fees: Conceptsto keep up %  ith population growth  and demand,  many poor countries have resorted to the widespread
implementation, of formal or informal user fees for health care in government health systems.2
Today user fiees constitute an important  source of financing for health care in most regions of the
developing woild.  In some countries, such as India, Nigeria, Pakistan,  Cambodia,  and Vietnam, out-of-
pocket spending accounts for more than half of total (public and private) health  expenditure.  User fees
play a predominant role in the financing of HIV/AIDS  health services as well.  The AIDS epidemic has
had profound implications  for health systems around the world,  including their financing and user fees
have also emerged as a main source of funds for HlV/AIDS care.  In Rwanda, they represent over 90
percent of all resources devoted to the treatment of HIV/AIDS  (Schneider 2001).
In the mid 1980s, the World Bank, along with USAID and UNICEF, was  a leading  international
development agency promoting the adoption of user fees for health care in the public health  sector of
developing countries (World Bank  1987).  Whereas many nations, such as Cambodia, had had user fees
for government health services well before the  1980s, the influence of these development agencies  was
partly responsilble  for the proliferation  of user fees.  The World Bank recognized that fees could limit
access to health  services by the poor, and therefore  most of its policy papers prescribed that fees should
be accompanied  by appropriate systems of waivers (De Ferranti  1985; Griffin  1992).  But despite their
theoretical  appeal, the viability of waivers and exemptions  is an empirical  question.  Some authors were
skeptical throughout that such mechanisms  could be adopted,  and criticized the World Bank for
overlooking the practical  difficulties of implementation  (Gilson  1988).  Since the early 1990s the World
Bank has de-ernphasized  user fees in the context of health financing and instead begun to promote risk
sharing (Worlcl  Bank 1997, Dror and Preker 2002, Preker forthcoming).
Waivers and exemptions -the subject of this paper- are  mechanisms intended to boost equity in access
and  in financing of health services when user fees are in  place.  The pervasive  and in places growing
presence of user fees in the health sector of developing countries, and the prospect that waivers and
exemptions  may improve equity in health, are the justification for this research.
1.3  The  policy debate  about user fees
There have been numerous theoretical  and empirical studies about the consequences of user fees for
health care in  developing countries.3 Below is discussion on the subject which draws on this literature; it
attempts to sumnmarize the major arguments for and against user fees.
Proponents of user fees for health care argue that fee revenue can make public spending more efficient:
by improving  the availability of complementary  inputs such as medicines, user fees help put to better use
the otherwise underutilized government-financed  health workers and infrastructure.  The expansion in
output volume that user fees bring about also improves the availability of services to the population.  In
addition, by financing medicines and other supplies, fees make it possible for government  health
providers to imnprove the quality of care (Birdsall  1983, Ainsworth  1984, Attah  1988, Nickson  1990).
Supporters of fees also note that even where government-provided  health services are nominally free of
charge,  in practice not only quality is low but there are hidden payments and additional user costs (such as
long waiting and private purchases of medicines) that result in low or unmet demand.  As a consequence,
low fees for low-quality public services constitute a less desirable policy than some fees for better quality
care.  Thus, user payments below private sector levels may suffice to make health services acceptable  and
available to the poor.  In many cases, the adoption of fees in public facilities helps to reduce poverty,  as
2  For a discussion of informal fees in the government  health sector see Lewis 2001
3  Wood (1997) offers  an excellent annotated  bibliography on the subject.
1. User Fees  Concepts  2modest public fees substitute much  higher payments made by the poor in the private sector (Akin  1986).
Evidence from the Dominican Republic and El Salvador  indicates that nominally free, low quality
government  health services face  low demand (Bitran  1987,  1989).  At the same time, even the poorest pay
substantial fees for better or more accessible private care, showing thereby that even the poor often prefer
to make some user fee payments rather than consume low quality,  free services (see Boxes I and 2).
Some also believe that fees convey a signal of higher service value that boosts demand above that
achieved when the same services are offered  free of charge.  Fees are also said to promote a sense of
ownership of the services received,  thus empowering consumers to demand greater quality and higher
provider accountability (Birdsall  1986).
Other authors also allude to the gains  in consumption efficiency that user fees for health care may bring
about.  User fees can deter spurious demand  and,  by reflecting the true relative costs of production, they
may promote more appropriate  (i.e., cost-effective)  demand patterns along the referral  system (de Ferranti
1985, Barnum  and Kutzin  1993).
Finally, some authors argue that user fees, when accompanied  by a well-functioning system of waivers or
exemptions, can help set up a pricing system with which to improve the targeting of public subsidies to
the poor (Gertler and Hammer  1997).
Detractors of user fees for health services  state that fees do more harm than good.  They argue that in
many cases where fees are imposed, the extra revenue  drawn represents only a small and irrelevant share
of total revenue (WHO Study Group  1993); yet at the same time the fees have a substantially  detrimental
effect on the demand by the poorest (Gilson and Russell  1994).  Further, they argue that often fee revenue
displaces public  subsidies, and therefore does not contribute to expand the revenue base of public
providers.
Those opposing fees also question the assertion that fees inhibit spurious demand  in the health sector
(Abel Smith  1993).  They claim that the main problem  in the health  sector of poor countries is, in fact,
under-utilization  of medical services,  instead of excess use.  Rather than deterring spurious demand,  fees
would inhibit appropriate demand, thus keeping use of preventive  and curative services below a social
optimum, particularly among the poorest members  of society.
While there  is evidence that specific fee structures  may improve health care demand  patterns -for
example higher consultation fees in public hospitals for those bypassing lower-level  facilities-  existing
demand pattems are often said to be a rational response by consumers to poor functioning services at the
primary level.  Consequently,  some argue, a policy that would be more efficient and equitable than bypass
fees would be the reallocation of funds away from public hospitals toward the under-funded  primary
level.  This would improve the ability of providers at that level to attract demand  and meet needs at a
relatively lower cost (Dercon and Ruttens 1998).
Accepting the argument that people are drawn  by higher rather than lower (or no) prices for the same
service would  be questioning the fact that, in general, consumption of goods drops as their price rises.
Finally, fees may confer users the right to demand  better health services, although if services were
improved through higher public funding and offered free of charge, demand would be higher than with
the fees.
1. User Fees: Concepts  3Box  1. Provider  characteristics  and  consumption  of  health  care  services  in  Santo  Domingo
(Dominican  Republic, 1987)  and San Salvador (El Salvador,  1989)
Even where  user fees in public
facilities are nomiinally very low or
zero,  poor quality of care, informal  Figure 0 Provider choice, by income quintile
fees, and accessibility problems  Santo Domingo  San Salvador
often  limit the use of public services  10__
by the poor.  At the same time,  iW
significant use of subsidized public  |
services by the non-poor reveals a  l
leakage of public subsidies, or the  ij  40%j  jIj  ]
greater ability of 1  he non-poor to  20%
pay informal fees in governmentc% *  *  *  *  ,  *  *  *  *  *
facilities.  0%  1  2  3  4  5  1  2  3  4  5
In Santo Domingo  and San  hcomqu  h.-  q.rWe
Salvador, for example, formal user  M  PnvatelE]_Mnistry_of_ealth___Soial_Secu
fees in Ministry of Health and Social  I  Pnvate  C  Mnisiry of Health  *  Soaat Secunly
Security public facilities were
insignificant by the late 1  980s, and  remain so today.  The  price of a curative medical consultation was 20 to 40 times
higher in the private sector than in public facilities.
Yet, as is seen Figure 0, in both cities and within all  Table 0  Payments to private health care providers
income groups, the majority of individuals obtained
care from  private providers, despite the relatively
much higher private prices.  High use of public
providers by non-poor individuals (say, from quintiles  Santo Domingo  San Salvador
3 and up), revealls a significant leakage, or a poor  Income quinble  (1987 pesos)  (1989  pesos)
targeting of public subsidies.  Qumntle 1 (poorest)  41  20
As is shown in Table 0, the out-of-pocket  Quintile 2  31  48
payments for private care did not differ greatly  by  Quintile 3  44  46
income for the bottom four quintiles in Santo
Domingo  and for the top four quintiles in San  Quintle 4  57  36
Salvador.  As a proportion of household monthly  Quintile 5  (richest)  82  45
income,  however, these payments varied significantly  Source  Bltran,  1987 and  1989
across quintiles, and were heavily regressive.
1. User Fees. Concepts  4Box 2.  User fees and equity in health
Under the right circumstances,  user fees may improve  Figure 0 Adoption of user fees  and quality
the welfare of the poor.  If fees are  used to improve quality  improvement:  Effect on demand
and if as a result of the quality improvement demand for
basic health care by the poor increases, then their welfare  F
unambiguously increases.  Newbrander et al. (2000)
present this issue graphically as in Figure 0.  If user-fee  Demand before
proceeds are kept locally by the provider and are used to  user fee and quality
improve quality -for example, to purchase more and better  improvement
medicines- then demand for the improved service by the
poor may expand.  This shift in demand can be high  B  Demand afer user
enough such that even with the higher price, quantity  improvement
demanded  (Qi) is greater than it was when the price was
zero and quality was  low (Qo).  \  --....
Outward shift in
This result requires that cost recovery revenue allow a  demand from quality
quality improvement sizable enough to promote  a  P, D  improvement  E
significant shift in demand.  Relative to a scenario of no fee
and low quality, consumer surplus increases with a higher  A  \C  \
fee and better quality if the area of the triangle DEF  is  0QO  C  Quantity
greater than that of the triangle ABC.  The gain in consumer  Increase in  quanbty  demanded
surplus from the user fee policy equals the difference in the  when pnce and quality are higher
area of the two triangles, or DEF-ABC.
Gilson (1997), in her review of the experience with user fees in the health sector in Africa,  notes:
Evidence suggests that if  fees are associated with quality improvements,  as in  community  financing schemes of the
(Bamako  Initiative] type, this offsets their negative impact on utilization, and the introductton of fees plus quality
improvements may even generate utilization increases among the poorest.4
Consumer surplus does not always increase when user fees are adopted,  however,  if fee revenue does not
permit, or is not used to finance a sizable improvement  in quality.  In  the same review Gilson concludes:
Countries have not realized many of the theoretical benefits of user fees because of implementation difficulties.  Thus
presenting case studies of good practice is  difficult.  Rather,  the most discernible lessons pertain to implementation
problems  and requisites for surmounting  them
Thus, these conclusions suggest that user fees should not always be discarded as undesirable, although  in
practice achieving the potential benefits of user fees is  not a trivial problem.  There is by now a growing body of
literature suggesting that user fees may adversely affect the poor. In health,  several studies have shown that demand
for health services is more price-elastic,  and that the price elasticity of demand -or people's sensitivity to price
changes-  is higher the lower a person's income.  In Cote d'lvoire, for example, the price elasticity of demand varied
between -0.3 for the highest income quintile and -1.8  for the lowest quintile (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1988).
Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987) used empirical  results from their analysis of health care demand in Peru to
suggest that the adoption of a flat consultation user fee in Ministry of Health facilities would promote inequity in
access.  Demand by the poor would drop significantly in response to a price increase and a simultaneous
improvement  in quality, while demand by the non-poor would  actually increase.  Consequently, the welfare of the
poor would fall with the flat fee policy and that of the non-poor would go up. These authors recommended the
adoption of a system of sliding fees on the basis of ability to pay.  There are several other examples of important
reductions in access after the introduction  of user fees in the health sector.
To sum up, proponents of user fees have argued that these
*  Generate additional revenue with which to improve health care quality
4  Gilson offers these thoughts on the basis of results from  an experience in  Cameroon,  documented  by Litvack and Bodart
(1993).
1. User Fees:  Concepts  5*  Increase demand for services owing to the improvement  in quality
*  May  reduce  out-of-pocket  and other costs, even for the poor, by substituting  public services
sold at relatively modest fees for higher-priced  and less accessible private services
*  Promote more efficient consumption  pattems, by reducing  spurious demand and encouraging
the use of cost-effective health  services
*  Encourage  patients  to  exert  their  right  to  obtain  good  quality  services  and  make  health
workers more accountable to patients
*  When combined  with a system of waivers and  exemptions,  serve  as an  instrument to target
public  subsidies to the poor and to reduce the leakage of subsidies to the non-poor.
Detractors of user fees argue that these:
*  Are  rarely used  to achieve significant  improvements  in  quality of care,  either because their
revenue  generating  potential  is  marginal  or  because  fee  revenue  is  not  used  to  financing
quality gains.
u  Do  not  curtail  spurious  demand  because  in  poor  countries  there  is  a  lack  not  an  excess
demand
*  Fail to promote cost-effective demand pattems because  the govemment health system fails to
make cost-effective services available to users
*  Hurt access by the  poor, and thus harm  equity,  because  appropriate  waivers  and exemption
systems are seldom implemented.
The opposing views about the desirability of user fees reflect both a difference  in ideology as well as
diversity in empirical circumstances.  For user fees to produce welfare gains for the poor, certain
conditions  must be met, and the evidence  shows that in practice that is not always the case.  Still, the
adoption of user fees tends to be a policy of choice in most developing countries.  This preference  seems
to respond prirnarily to practical  considerations.  Despite their potential  adverse effect on equity, user fees
are relatively easy to implement and therefore they tend to be preferred  over other, harder to adopt
policies.  Optional policies, but ones that generally are viewed as less viable than user fees, include an
increase  in government  health budgets, additional taxation earmarked for health, the reallocation of
government  health funds from richer to poorer  regions,  risk sharing arrangements,  the reallocation of
public funds from  urban hospitals to rural primary level facilities,  and the targeting of public health
subsidies toward the poor.
1. User Fees.  Concepts  61.4  Equity in health
A commonly accepted principle  in  the  Figure 0  Equity in the delivery and  financing of basic curative
context of health services  is that equity holds  health care
when consumption  is in accordance  with need
and financing is in accordance with ability to
pay (Figure 0).5  Need for health care varies
from one individual to another,  and to some  Consumpton  Payments
extent is random and largely unpredictable.
Over large population groups, however,  {
health care needs are negatively  correlated  - ___
with income,  i.e., poorer individuals tend to  Er
E
have a lower health status and thus need more  ,
0 health care.  If health  care consumption were
in accordance with medical need,  one would
expect to find that, on a per capita basis, the
poor would consume greater amounts of
curative  health care services than the non-
poor.  A necessary  condition  for  Poorest  Income
consumption to match need in health is that
access -physical, financial,  and cultural- to appropriate services be should favor those with greatest need.
In particular,  there should be no financial barriers  for those wishing to obtain basic health care.  For the
poor, this means that direct payment for basic services, in the form of medicines  or consultation fees
should be lower than for the non-poor.  Equity in financing  holds when those with equal ability to pay
make equal payments for basic health care  (horizontal equity in financing) and those with greater ability
to pay make higher payments (vertical  equity in financing).  Payments  include direct and indirect taxes,
payments to social  security and to insurance (mainly for health care), prepayments  for health care, and all
out-of-pocket payments for services.
1.5  The  rationale for waivers and exemptions
For normal goods, such as quality curative  health care, demand by the non-poor is greater, on a per capita
basis, than demand by the poor.  This means that at any given price, such as a flat fee  (Pflatjfee)  in the left
panel of Figure 1, the non-poor will demand higher quantities  (Qnonpoor) than the poor (Qpor).  The higher
demand  by the non-poor responds to their higher income.  It also reflects their greater education and the
higher associated awareness about the benefits of timely, quality health care.  Thus, with a flat fee the
poor will be at a relative disadvantage.  Sliding fees, or price  discrimination, can help solve this problem.
To simplify,  it is assumed that per capita health care need is equal for the poor and the non- poor.  If a
sufficiently lower fee can be charged to the poor, such as Ppoor in the right panel of Figure  1, then their per
capita demand will equal that of the non-poor.
Protecting the poor from user fees entails exactly this kind of mechanism:  the structuring of a fee system
that promotes equal per capita consumption  by the poor and the non-poor.6 In theory, then, the problem
of mitigating the negative consequences of user fees on the poor is solved quite simply.  It suffices to
know the slope and position of the demand curves, something that can be estimated empirically through
household survey data.  In practice,  however, it is necessary to know who is poor and who is not, and to
This is the principle proposed by van Doorslaer, Wagstaff,  and Rutten (eds ) (1993).
More generally,  with greater per capita health care need  by the poor, equitable pricing is one that leads to higher per
capita consumption  by the poor.
1. User Fees: Concepts  7apply differential  prices appropriately.  Experience shows,  alas, that this is an extremely difficult practical
problem,  wilh rnajor administrative and logistical requirements.  Further, it has been shown that fees are
not the only costs faced by potential users of health services.  For example, in Cambodia transportation
and food costs associated with the use of hospital services can  greatly exceed the fees charged by the
provider (Hardeman 2001).  Thus, while fee exemptions may improve equity in access, to be effective  in
some cases the,  must be accompanied by supplementary  subsidies to defray additional and significant
non-fee costs associated with consumption.
Figure 1 Flat fee  and sliding fee  policies: Effect on the demand  by the poor and the non-poor
Flat-fee polic.y  the  poor demand less per capita than the  Sliding-fee policy: the poor and the non-poor have equal per
non-poor  capita demand
Pnce  Pnce
Demand  by  lOfpOOr  Demandby
the non-poor  the non-poor
Demand  by  p o__  Demand  by
the poor  P0O  the poor
Q,o  Q-poo,  Quantty  Qpor=Qn-Fpo  Quantity
Difference  In  per capita  equal per cap,ta demand
demand  between poor and  for poor  and  non-poor, wth
non-poor with flat-fee policy  sliding fees
A main reason behind the practical difficulty of  Figure 1 Propensity to misrepresent one's
telling poor from non-poor resides in the incentives  economic  status as a function  of the size of
facing the non -poor to misreport their identity.  If a  the benefit and the magnitude of the sanction
subsidized service wanted by the poor and the non-  if cauaht Ivina
poor is made available to all, it will be demanded by
both groups.  But fiscal constraints  in poor countries  expected
imply that good quality, fully subsidized  health care  sanction
cannot always be made available to all.  There is  °  Middie
need to ration the subsidized  benefit, and the  E  sanction
appropriate policy decision  is to keep the non-poor
out of the subsidized  scheme.  Yet if the subsidized  _/  High
c  expected services are  wanted by all, chances are that the non-  ssanctin
poor will seek to misrepresent their status, to be  santi/
classified as poor and thus obtain the subsidy.  This  e
is illustrated  in Figure  1. The upward slope of the
"propensit)  to lie" curve shows that the higher the  Size  of the  benefit (eg  amount  of subsidized,  quaiity  healh care)
payoff (i.e., the desirability of the subsidized
service), the greater the propensity of the non-poor to lie.  If it were somehow possible  for the provider of
the subsidized  social service to tell  poor from non-poor,  for example through a home visit by an
incorruptible social worker, and to sanction those lying, then the liars would be facing a known sanction
with a known probability.  This is not different,  conceptually, to the problem  of tax evasion.  Figure  I
shows that the  higher the expected value of the sanction,  the lower the propensity of the non-poor to
misrepresent their status.  Unfortunately  there is no such thing as a perfect system of sanctions,  and often
the optimal policy is the adoption of a combination of incentives -both positive and negative- that lead
1. User Fees: Concepts  8most individuals to behave  in accordance  with what the managers of social  programs expect. Constructing
and implementing  such a set of incentives requires skill,  resources,  and information, and constitutes the
great challenge of implementing effective and efficient targeted social programs for enhancing the well-
being of the poor.  The experience  of Colombia helps to illustrate the difficulties of avoiding the leakage
of subsidies to the non-poor (Box 3).
1. User Fees: Concepts  9Box 3. Colombia's  experience trying to tell the poor from the non-poor
In the  mid  1990s  Colombia  began  implementing  a  The  effort appears largely successful in  reaching  the
major  health  reform  known  as  Law  100.  A  main  poor  in  those  municipalities  that  have  received
reform  aim  was  achieving  an  improvement  in the  adequate  resources.  Yet  it  has  been  reported  that
targeting  of public health  subsidies for the  poor.  To  some families that would otherwise  not qualify for the
achieve  this,  municipalities  around  the  country  were  subsidy,  rent for a few  hours  a  poor  family's  house
given  resources  and  were  assigned  the  task  of  prior to  being  subject to  the  test,  to  qualify  as,  thus
carrying  out  surveys  of  all  households  in  their  defeating  the  targeting  tool.  Also,  some  individuals
commune  to  identify  those  that were  poor.  Poverty  subject  to  assessment  by  social  workers  in public
was  determined  on  the  basis  of various  household  hospitals are said to purchase false utility bills on  the
characteristics,  such  as  quality  and  size  of  the  basis  of  which  hospital  staff  make  a determination
construction,  number  of  household  members,  about  who  pays  what  amount  for  health  services.
education levels, and so on  Falsifiers of bills  station  themselves in  kiosks  outside
of the  hospitals  and  sell  customized  bills  that  make
the buyer look poor.
1. User Fees  Concepts  102  Mitigating the effect of fees:  Identifying
and  protecting the poor
Preserving equitable access to health services under a system of user fees can be accomplished  in three
steps (Figure 2).  First, the poor population  to receive preferential treatment with respect to user fees must
be identified.  Second, a protection mechanism must be selected and implemented.  Third, to ensure that
the protection policy is working adequately, an evaluation of its performance  is required.  Issues pertaining
to these three steps are addressed  in this chapter.
Figure 2 Steps  in the adoption of pro-poor protection mechanisms
Ste)  I  Ste1  2  Step 3
Identif  benefiiariesSelect  and  Evaluate Identfy beneficnaries  implement  performance  of
ofpection  protection  protection
mechanism  mechanism  mechanism
2.1  Identification of beneficiaries of protection mechanisms
There are several  methods available  to identify those in need of protection  and thus to target public
subsidies towards those requiring protection.  These methods constitute an alternative to the traditional
approach of health ministries consisting of universal provision (see Box 5).  Which targeting method
works best in practice  depends on its administrative feasibility and costs, political viability, impact on
demand, and other factors (see Box 6).'  Different authors offer different typologies of targeting
methods.8 The following four categories, depicted  in Figure 6, are retained in this paper (for a further
description and comparison of these targeting methods see Appendix A):
*  Individual  identification
*  Identification  based on group characteristics
*  Self-identification
*  Self-selection by type of service
(a)  Individual identification
With this method, who is entitled or eligible to subsidized health services is determined through an
assessment of individual characteristics  such as income,  health status, behavior,  nutritional status, or other
criteria.  Where ability to pay is the basis for selection,  the assessment,  which  is typically carried out by a
7  See Sen  (1995)
Grosh (1995)  recognized  three main  methods  (1)  individual assessment  mechanisms,  (2)  group or geographic targeting,
and  (3)  self-targeting,  Glewwe  and  van der Gaag  (1988)  and Willis (1993)  distinguish between  two types of targeting. (1)
characteristic targeting (equivalent  to Grosh's group targeting),  and (2)  direct targeting (based  on direct individual or household
assessment).  The World Bank (1993)  identifies (1)  individual targeting,  (2)  group targeting,  (3)  self-targeting,  and (4)  targeting by
type of service.
2. Mitigating the effect of fees  11social worker or a specially trained health worker, may be based on income.  But where target
beneficiaries  work mostly in the informal economy assessing  income can in practice be very difficult.  In
those circumstances,  other methods of assessing ability to pay are used, including means tests and proxy
means tests (see  Willis 1993  and Appendix A).
(b)  Identification based  on group characteristics
Assessing individual characteristics  is not always easy or efficient.  For example,  suppose that a carefully
conducted household survey carried out on a sample of households reveals that the vast majority,  say 85
percent, of the  inhabitants in a particular geographic region are poor and should be target beneficiaries  of
a subsidized  program.  Given the high percentage of target beneficiaries, it may be more efficient to
confer protection to all area residents than trying to assess individual characteristics  to single out, at a
high administrative  cost, the non-target population (the non-poor 15 percent).  The cost of identifying the
poor and the non-poor could exceed the amount of subsidies that would leak out to the non-poor if no
targeting effort were in place.  In such circumstances,  protection is provided at the group level, where a
group may be a geographic area known to be predominantly very poor.  The leakage to the non-poor is
tolerated  on efficiency grounds.
(c)  Self-ideintification
In self-identification,  no effort is made by the agency granting the protection to identify its recipients
because  individuals self-select.  That is, the health services  are provided  in such a way that it is mostly
those individuals eligible for protection who will come forth and demand the services, whereas non-target
persons will  mostly demand services  elsewhere.  For example, this can  be achieved  by operating a health
center in a predominantly poor neighborhood.  Most users will be the very poor who inhabit the area
whereas  fewer non-poor will decide to seek care there, because of stigma, safety concerns,  long waiting
lines, the lack of amenities, or other reasons.  A system designed for self-identification  may sometimes
impose  high private costs to the beneficiaries,  such as safety problems  and the opportunity cost of the
wait.
(d)  Self-selection  by type of service
The idea here is to offer subsidized  services that, for epidemiological,  cultural or other reasons, are
demanded  disproportionately by the poor, or target group, given the special health circumstances and
income constraints they face.  This is the main idea imbedded  in the supply of a basic package of health
services in developing countries.  The treatment of dehydration from diarrhea, nutritional  supplements,
and the caring for sexually transmitted diseased and tuberculosis  are all examples of services that, if
made universally available, would especially benefit the poor.
2. Mitigating the effect of fees  12Box S.  Universal versus targeted  provision
Despite  its theoretical appeal and
favorable results around the developing  Figure 2 Indonesia: The allocation of government
world in other social sectors targeting  health care  subsidies. 1987
still remains a relatively infrequent
method of directing government health  200  - - - - - -
subsidies.  In  fact, the most widely  Subsidies
practiced  method in the developing  received from
world for reaching the poor with free or  E 150  govemment
subsidized government  social services  a  health centers  K  8  42.3
is universal provision, also known as  a  -_
5.  100  _ general price subsidies. Universal  7  435
provision refers  to the traditional  X  38
provider arrangements  of national or  :  50  388
regional health ministries around the  a.
developing world, which offer free or
subsidized care to all patients, often  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  lo
regardless of ability to pay (see Figure 3  Income decde  Subsidies
below).  However, van de Walle (1995a)  received from
states that  govemment
hospitals
uuniversal provision is too costly and
fails to have  much impact on poverty  subsidized ambulatory services.  Yet the non-poor obtained a much
and that targeting can promote  cost-  larger share of hospital care than they should  (i.e., if all citizens,
effectiveness.  So, in the context of  irrespective  of income, were entitled to an equal amount of subsidy).
pressures to reduce public expenditures,  This is attributable to the fact that government hospitals were  mostly
the view has become widespread that  located in urban areas were most of the non-poor tend to live, and
targeting allows governments to reduce  also to the greater ability of the non-poor to secure public subsidies.
poverty more effectively and at a lower  Recent data from  Morocco signal the occurrence of a similar
cost",  phenomenon  there.  In  Morocco the poor can obtain indigence
certificates through their local governments,  thereby becoming
There is ample evidence from the  entitled to free  care in government  health facilities.  The process for
developing world that universal provision  the awarding of such certificates, however,  is subject to abuse,  and
of health services leads to a situation  thus subsidies appear to be poorly targeted.  It is estimated that the
where only a share of the public subsidy  richest quintile captures 40 percent of MOH spending while the
reaches the poor while a sizable portion  poorest 40 percent receives less than 20 percent of MOH resources
of it leaks out to the non-poor.  Such  (World  Bank 2001 b).  When there is a leakage there is a case for
was the case in Indonesia in 1997, as is  improving the efficacy of targeting,  as this will help to reach the poor
shown in Figure 2.  The poor and the  with the subsidy and thus exempt them from the fees
non-poor consumed similar amounts  of
2.  Mitigating the effect of fees  13Figure 3  Universal vs. targeted  provision of health care
SUBSIDIES
UNIVERSAL  PROVISION
Universal  provision  offers  subsidized
services to the all citizens,  irrespective
_  _  _  r__________________________________________  of their socioeconomic status or needs
lTi  i  i  Il  I  Thus,  some  of  the  poor  obtained
1  t  s  r  t  1 t  fl  1subsidized  services  (A)  while  some
A A A  C  C  B  nnon-poor  also do so (B)  Owmng to the A  B  B  D  limited  nature  of  subsidies,  and  of  the
64f  %  6"fi  (  %  tefi  l)  (P),  ffi  XPIk  to  fi  m  (6  t  I  services they finance, some people are
_  /  ~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~~~~~  /wl  ~~~~~~~~~~left  wwthout  subsidized  services
_ _  _ _ _ _  _  I  1/  1/  1/  1  Among  them  are  some  of  the  poor,
POORAi  A  NON-POORA  / ""_'  A  (C),  and some of the non-poor (D)
POOR  NON-POOR ~~~~~~~..  . . . . . . . ....  .....  . . . . ......  .....  ....  ....  ..... a.a.......*X  X
ADMINISTRATIVE
one rei  0fi one  ffi  (0fi\  t-fIN  n$o "  EXPENSES  TARGETED  PROVISION
Targeted  provision  adopts  mechan-
isms to  channel  resources  toward  the
_ _  __  X *  poor  It  is successful if it increases the
A  A  A  A  A  A  C  B  D  D  D  G  amount  of subsidies reaching the poor
A  A~~~~  ~  A  (A)  while reducing  the flow of subsidies 4  to  the  non-poor  (B)  But  sometimes
target-ing  procedures  have  an
_i  _T  _  _administrative  cost  (G)  -for  example
|  the  salaries  of  social  workers  who
Identify  the  poor  through  individual
interviews  This  administrative  cost
reduces  the  amount  of  subsidies
_~~j  A-  CORRECT  INCLUSION  OF  THE  POOR  available  to  pay  for  social  services,
SUBSIDIES  B= WRONG  INCLUSION  OF  THE  NON.POOR  thus  leaving  some of the  poor without
C= WRONG  EXCLUSION  OF 'HE POOR  access to the subsidized services
D.CORRECT  EXCLUSIONOF  THE  NON  POOR
Source  Bitran 2000
2.  Mitigating the effect of fees  14Box 6. Targeting  effort and incidence:  Empirical evidence from Latin America
To assess the tradeoff between administrative  terms of incidence of benefits, as is shown  in Figure
costs of targeting and targeting outcomes of  5. Individual  assessment mechanisms achieved a
govemment-subsidized  social programs,  Grosh  median of benefits going to the poorest 2 quintiles of
(1995)  carried out an empirical  review of 30 such  73 percent.  The equivalent figure for geographic
programs  in Latin America, including ones in health  targeting mechanisms was 72 percent, while for self-
and education.  Most were government programs with  targeting it was 71  percent.  In  addition, there were
national coverage; several of the newest programs  only minor differences in the performance of these
were specifically motivated  by increases in poverty in  different mechanisms among the various countries in
the 1980s or by the need to mitigate the social costs  the sample.
of macroeconomic adjustment programs.  Seventeen  Figure  5 Share  of benefits accruing to the
of the programs used individual assessment
mechanisms, seven used group or geographic  poorest 40 percent, by targeting  mechanism
mechanisms, and six were self-targeted  (see Figure
6).  Grosh's two research questions were (1)  which  .o
targeting mechanisms  provide the best targeting
outcomes? And (2) what are their administrative
costs?  ,  i
She found that targeted programs  had better
S. incidence, i.e., a greater proportion of the subsidy
reached the poor than with the  untargeted general
food price subsidies (Figure 4).  The best performing  2.
general food price subsidy program (that is, the least
regressive of them), delivered  37 percent of the  0
subsidy to the poorest 40 percent of all households.  INDIVIDUAL  GEOGRAPHIC  SELF-
The worst performer of the targeted programs (i.e.,  ASSESSMENT.  ASSESSMENT,  ASSESSMENT
the least progressive of them) channeled  59 percent  N  - IDO
of the benefits to the poorest 40 percent of the  I___  HIGH  __  MID___  LOW__
population.  On average,  33 percent of the benefits of
general food price subsidies went to the poorest two  Although targeted programs had a much better
quintiles, while for the targeted programs the figure  incidence that untargeted ones, Grosh had to
was 72 percent.  examine the relative costs of both types of program to
be able to infer their relative merits.
Figure 4 Share of benefits accruing to  The median cost of targeting as a  share of total
poorest 40 percent, by sector  program costs was 6 percent for programs relying on
self-targeting, 7 percent for those using geographic
assessment,  and 9 percent for programs that relied on
individual assessment.  Not all program administrative
n  .,  costs are associated with the actual effort of targeting,
2  .. .. however.  Still, targeting costs (beneficiary
identification, or screening) were relatively modest, I  I  ,  ,  accounting for a share of total program costs that
I  l  varied between 0.4 percent and 8 percent.  Finally,
Grosh  examined whether programs  that succeeded in
channeling a greater proportion of benefits to the
GEOERALFODO  TARGETED  PNNMARY  PMMARY  poorer income groups cost more administratively.
3UBSIDIEJ,  PROGRAMS  HEALTH  CARE,  EDUCATION
N-7  NU1I  N-11  N-11  She concluded that was no clear connection between
HIGH  _  MID  LOW  targeting results and administrative costs.
Grosh also found that different targeting
mechanisms  produced rather similar outcomes in
2.  Mitigating the effect of fees  15Figure 6 Identification methods
Methods
Individual  Group
Eligibiliy for protection is established on an  A collection of individuals is selected for protection
individual basis  based on location, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.
Meet  Do not meet
Group  - \
Get Protection  - Do not  - selection  No..- get protection
By tvDe of service  Self
The poor tend to demand the subsidized service  For epidemiological reasons, the service provided is
more frequently than others  demanded  mostly by those requiring protection
No,-  t:  IDangerus  area  of
L..J  (~~~~~~~~~~~~9  t~~~~~.  - i~~~~~~owri.,  long  vri,ng
Serirces  Services  Look  L .0k for
without or  subject to  belier, pa  better,  paid
With  low  fees  care'  ae
user fees  3isewh.  elsewtere
Mixed
A combination of two or more of the four methods
2.2  Protection mechanisms:  Waivers,  exemptions,  and design features
(a)  Waivers
A waiver is a tight conferred to an individual that entitles him or her to obtain health  services  in certain
health facilities at no direct charge or at a reduced price (see Figure 7).  The subjects  of waivers  are
individuals  The existence of waivers in a health system implies that the system will discriminate
between waiver holders and the rest of the population.  By reducing the out-of-pocket  cost of care to
beneficiaries,  waivers seek to improve both equity in access and equity in financing of health services.
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Main target group: the poor and the near poor
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Waiver on the  Service I
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health services at no fees or at  are allowed to  fees
reduced fees  pay reduced fees
Other
Groups
Example 2  Servicei1
Waiver on the
basis of ethnicity  Service
Service n
Main target group: the disadvantaged ethnic groups
(b)  Exemptions
Whereas waivers are associated to certain  individuals, exemptions are associated to certain services.  An
exempt service is one that is to be provided at no charge (or at a reduced  price) to patients.  In its broadest
form, a waiver entitles its holder to receive all services at no direct charge;  in its broadest form, an
exemption implies that the exempt service will be provided to all individuals at no charge.  Exemptions
are adopted mainly for efficiency reasons and thus seek to correct some market failures.  Their purpose is
to promote the consumption of specific health services,  including those whose benefits are under-valued
by the population, those that have externalities,  or those that are pure public goods.  Vaccinations are a
typical example of an exemption whose purpose is to correct information failures  (uneducated people tend
to fear vaccines or under-value  their benefits) and to promote consumption  for a medical service that has
an externality.
Figure 8 Exemption
Exemption:  The  Main target group: the poor and the near poor
condition
assigned to a  Near  Non
service whereby  Poor  Poor  Poor  All  people,
no user fee is  Service  i  trrespective of
charged for it to  their ability to
consumers, or  I  pay, can
whereby the same  _  obtain this
reduced fee  is  _  service at no
charged to all  ior  at a
consumers,  subsidized
irrespective of  Sepcn  sbiiee
their ability to pay
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Waivers and exemptions  may be combined,  thus setting a system where certain individuals are entitled to
obtain certain health services for free or with a subsidy (Figure 9).
Figure 9  Waiver and exemption  combined
exemDtion  Main target group: the poor and the near poor
combined:  Waiver  Non Poor
Some  holders  Service I
individuals  can obtain
this service
are  granted  at no direcl=
the right to  charge or
obtain some  ata
services  at no  subsidized  1  1  11n
direct charge  prce  n
or at a
reduced price  People in these groups are
waived the requirement to
pay user fees or are allowed
to pay reduced fees
(d)  Design features for waivers and  exemptions
Designing and implementing a system of exemptions  is considerably simpler than doing so with a system
of waivers.  A  system of exemptions requires one initial basic  decision, namely determining  which
services will be offered  for free or at reduced  prices.  Such a determination  may respond to specific
economic and medical  criteria, such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.  Once that decision
has been made, managing the system of exemptions tends to be administratively  simpler than managing  a
system of waivers.  This relative simplicity stems from the fact that a system of exemptions  imposes no
need for identification of beneficiaries -a  major hurdle in a system of waivers.  Adopting exemptions thus
can be as easy as imparting the order among the concerned providers that the services to be exempted are
to be offered at no charge to all customers.  Most developing countries have systems of exemptions,  and
these function  quite well and impose only minor administrative  demands.  For example, in some countries
some primary and preventive services,  such as child immunizations,  are offered for free  in all public
facilities and to all patients country-wide.
Aside from deciding which services are to be waived, designing a system of exemptions entails also
determining who will deliver the exempt services -it  can be public,  private for profit, and private non-
profit providers- and how the costs of delivery will be financed  by the payer of services.  A common
situation  is that the providers of exempt services are all public and their funding comes from their fixed
monthly budget,  in which case the payment system remains easy to manage.  Universal provision of
health services free of charge to all  in government facilities that are financed through historic budgets  is a
generalized  system of exemptions.  In some situations, the funding of exempt services may come from
payments made by the financing agency to the provider of exempt services on the basis of a previously
agreed on payrnent  mechanism,  in which case management may become more complex.  Capitation
requires that a list of registered  beneficiaries be handed by the provider to the payer; fee-for-service
requires that periodic  invoices be submitted by the provider to the payer;  and so on.  Brazil's Sistema
Unico de Sauide (SUS)  offers a large set of exempt services to Brazil's population through a nationwide
network of public and private providers, to which it has to pay for exempt services on the basis of diverse
payment systems.
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waivers,  it does not impose the need to identify individual beneficiaries.  A system of exemptions shares
with a system of waivers the administrative requirement that a payment system be in place to defray the
costs of the services that are offered at reduced prices or for free.
Designing and implementing  a system of waivers is, in contrast,  considerably more complex because it
imposes the adoption of different rules for different  individuals.  The need to classify individuals as
beneficiaries  and non-beneficiaries  of waivers,  along with the need to identify them at the point of service
imposes major administrative demands on the health system.  Here, many design options arise and these
impose a series of consequences for the health system,  in terms of incidence of benefits and
administrative costs.  Table 2 outlines in the form of questions the design options that the policymaker
wishing to adopt a system of waivers faces.  The last two columns of the table show that some questions
apply both to waivers and exemptions, whereas others apply only to one or the other system.  The design
options of Table 2 have been classified in four distinct categories,  as follows:
*  Resource  availability: How  much  money will  be available  to  finance  waivers  and  exemptions?
Often,  policymakers  adopts  waiver  and  exemption  systems  without  making  the  necessary
provisions  to  ensure that there  is  a match  between  the total  production  cost  of the services  to be
waived or exempted  and the funds available to finance the policy.  Achieving such a match requires
that estimates  be available  about  the total  beneficiary  population,  their demand  for the waived  or
exempt services, and the cost of those services.
*  General  design  and  implementation:  Adopting  a system  of waivers  or exemptions  involves  a
series of design issues.  One central  issue is the revision of the existing system of user fees with the
aim of furthering the objectives  of the waiver or exemption system.  This means that user fees must
be  in place for those with an ability to pay  (patients not entitled to waivers must  pay the ongoing
fee)  and  that  only  exempt  services  must  be  provided  free  of charge  (non-exempt  services  are
charged  to  patients).  Revising  the user  fee policy  is  important  whether the  facility  is allowed  to
retain the  revenue  locally  or whether  user  fee  proceeds  must be returned  to  a regional  or central
authority;  in  either  case  user  fee  revenue  will  eventually  ease  the  fiscal  impact  of a  waiver  or
exemption  policy.  There are other key design and implementation  issues and these are outlined in
Table 2.  They involve determining  which services  are to be exempted  or which  individuals  are to
be  waived,  the  duration  of the  exemption  or  waiver,  choosing  an  identification  (or  targeting)
instrument, and deciding who will administer the system,  among other things.
*  Supply-side design  and  implementation  features:  As already  noted, the particular design of the
waiver  or  exemption  system  conveys  specific  incentives  to  the  providers  of services.  A  good
design  is  one  which  confers  incentives  leading  providers  to  behave  in  ways  that  further  the
objectives of the waiver  or exemption  system.  That is, a good design  leads to the provision of the
appropriate amount of waivers to the target beneficiaries, the denial of waivers to non-beneficiaries,
and the provision of the right kinds of exemptions.  Clear and  realistic definitions of beneficiaries,
and appropriate  dissemination  of information  about  procedures,  are  factors  that contribute to the
success of a waiver system.  In contrast, a faulty design may defeat the waiver or exemption policy.
For example,  an ambiguous or complex  definition of a beneficiary  in a waiver system can lead  to
failure.  Examples of successful  and unsuccessful  experiences  are provided in Chapter 3.
*  Demand-side  side  design  and  implementation  features:  Waivers  and  exemption  systems
confer  incentives  to consumers,  or should  be accompanied  by  incentives  which  must  be  aligned
with  the  aims  of the  systems.  For  instance,  where  exemptions  exist for  some  services,  such as
institutional  deliveries,  appropriate  information  must  be  disseminated  among  pregnant  women,
often  with  the  help  of promoters  and  community  leaders,  to  foster  an  understanding  about  the
health  benefits  of institutional  deliveries  and,  thus,  to  promote  demand  for  the  exempt  service.
Simply exempting institutional  deliveries may in some circumstances be an insufficient incentive to
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services to  holders  of an indigence  card may fail to draw target beneficiaries  if access  costs other
than the user  fee (e.g.,  travel  costs and the opportunity  cost of time) are high.  In  such a case, the
waiver  system  may  also  have  to  envision  funds  and  a  mechanism  for  defraying  those  other
consumption costs of target patients.
As already noted, relative to exemptions waivers have the added difficulty that they are awarded  on the
basis on persorial  characteristics.  Therefore they require an administration for the waiver process and the
adoption of decisions regarding the awarding of waivers.  These are discussed  next.
Waivers:  Design and  implementation  issues
Who grants waivers?  Whose responsibility is it to identify those to be protected: An epidemiologist with
the MOH, a specialist with the National  Statistical Institute,  a social worker with the agency delivering
the social services, or a doctor working in the hospital?  In El Salvador,  MOH officials determine on the
basis of a broad  set of poverty and health status indicators which  health districts  are entitled to a free
package of health services.  In Zaire's health zones,  it is the nurse running the health center who makes
the determination  about who is fully or partially exempted  from fees.  Thus, waivers may be granted  by a
special administrative  body that is separate from a health facility,  in which case waiver beneficiaries  must
carry some kind of identification  that distinguishes them  from non-beneficiaries when demanding  health
services.  Or waivers may be provided health facility staff and in that case identification may be
unnecessary.  When  an entity other than the health provider grants waivers  a conflict of interest presents
itself if the cost of the waived services  is not faced entirely by the entity issuing the waiver and if the
waiving agency is rewarded on the basis of the volume of waivers granted.  In Cambodia,  for example,
some equity funds granting waivers  do not have to reimburse  health providers for the full cost of waived
services  and therefore  they may over-provide waivers. Suriname's  Ministry of Social Affairs used to
over-provide  waivers because it did not face the full cost of waived services,  and its staff derived personal
benefits from  issuing waivers.  When that situation changed,  and MSA begun to face the full cost of
health care, the agency became much more stringent and reduced the number of waivers granted.
Are waivers supply- or demand-driven?  Does the identification  system actively search for prospective
beneficiaries,  or does it passively wait for them to show up and request protection?  In Suriname, the
Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA)  issues MSA cards that exempt cardholders  from the payment of user
fees in govermnent hospitals.  To obtain the card individuals  must apply as the MSA does not actively
search for potential beneficiaries.  In Colombia,  in contrast, the Beneficiary Identification System
(SISBEN) run by municipalities  actively interviews all households  in their jurisdiction, and selects the
ones to enter the Subsidized  Regime.  All beneficiaries of the Subsidized Regime are automatically
entitled to a gcvernment subsidy that covers their health insurance premium.
When are waivers granted?  Waivers may be provided  at different  moments in time.  For example, they
may be distributed to beneficiaries in their homes or in the premises of an administrative agency when
individuals are  in no imminent need for health services.  Beneficiaries thus carry the waiver document
with them in case they will need to produce it at a health facility  in the future,  should the need for health
services arise.  Chile's National Health Fund (FONASA) provides  waiver cards to the indigent and these
present the cards to public providers when demanding health  services, thus receiving  free care.
Alternatively, waivers may be provided by health facility staff or by a special agency at the time when
health services are demanded.  Such is the case  in Cambodia's Takeo Hospital,  where specially trained
health staff subject waiver applicants to the means test on site, asking them to fill out a form answering
various questions about their employment, house characteristics,  number and age of household members,
possession of vehicles and other durable assets,  and ownership of domestic  animals.  Waiver granting
staff thus compute  a score on the basis of the answers  given and provide a waiver if the score is below a
certain threshold.
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behavior if the waiver application costs, also known  as "participation  costs", are high or if prospective
applicants are uncertain about their chances of getting a waiver.  In situations where waivers are granted
ex-ante,  waiver beneficiaries know with certainty that if they demand health services in certain locations
they will be entitled to free care.  Thus, their demand for care will not be diminished  by the prospect of an
out-of-pocket payment.  In contrast, in situations where a waiver determination  is made each time a health
service is demanded, some prospective patients may get discouraged  from seeking care if waiver
participation costs are high or if their perceived  likelihood of getting a waiver  is uncertain.  Participation
costs refer to the economic, time, and other costs that an  individual has to incur to apply for a waiver.  For
example, Table  I presents some of the requirements  set forth by a government agency in a Latin
American country to grant waiver cards for health care or to provide free care to those not entitled to a
waiver card.  This is an example of a waiver process with high participation  costs.  If the waiver granting
entity is known by the target population to always awards waivers to applicants, as was the case of
Suriname's Ministry of Social Affairs,9 then  when the waiver is provided -ex ante or at the time the
services  are needed- makes no difference  in terms of people's health care  seeking behavior.  Those
needing care will demand services equally, whether they already have a waiver card in their possession of
whether they do not have a card but are certain that they will obtain free care.
Table  1 Requirements  to obtain health  services waiver: example  from Latin America
Individuals entitled to a waiver health  Dependent  Worker  Dependent  Worker
card: requirements  to obtain the card  Indefinite Contract  Temporary  Contract  Retired
Application  form  Yes  Yes  Yes
Photocopy of work contract  Yes  Yes
Contribution  certificate  Yes, last payment  Yes, payments for at least  No, but must present
6 months  pension  payment coupon
Personal  national identification card  Yes  Yes  Yes
Family dependent's  national  identification card  Yes  Yes  Yes
Certificate  of dependence  Yes, from birth registry  Yes, from  birth registry  Yes, from  pension Fund
manager
Duration  of waiver  2 years  12 months  Indefinite
Individuals not entitled to a waiver
health card: requirements to obtain free
health services  Independent Worker  Unemployed Worker  Indigent
Certificate of indigence  No  No  Yes
Contribution certificate  Yes,  payments for at
least 6 months
Personal national  identification card  Yes  Yes  Yes
Family dependent's  national identification card  Yes  Yes  Yes
Certificate of dependence  Yes, pension fund
manager
Pension fund affiliation certificate  Yes
Other  Unemployment subsidy  Health condition certificate
card  from the health service or
municipality
Eligibility  requirements.  What information is required for identification:  data from a household  survey,
individual tax forms, proof of income, and assessment of assets or enrollment  in other social protection
programs?  If administrative requirements  for identification  are major (as in the case of Kenya described
in Chapter 3) then participation  costs might be too high, thus leading to a modest level of identification
(under-coverage).  If, on the other hand, the requirements  are too few, then leakage  may be high.
Eligibility requirements may be as simple  as responding to and passing an on-site interview to a longer
and more demanding process such as the one described  in Table 1.  In an effort to increase precision,
those designing and managing eligibility processes tend to adopt complex,  demanding,  and time
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prospective  applicants.  Those who choose to comply may be lower-income persons whose opportunity
cost is lower than the value of the benefits that the waiver carries, but such cumbersome  procedures may
also discourage  application from some  low income individuals wary of questions and bureaucracy.
Finding the right balance between the stringency of a means test for waivers and the coverage of the
waiver prograrn  (percentage of the poor who actually  benefit from waivers) is a major challenge for
policymakers.
Duration  of Naiver  Waivers can  be temporary or permanent. The most short-lived waiver is that provided
for a specific service within a health facility.  For example, a patient who is hospitalized may have to
request a waiver for the payment of a laboratory exam, and then again, during the same hospitalization, he
or she may have to apply repeatedly for waivers on other medical procedures,  such as the surgical fees or
the medicines received.  Such an atomized waiver procedure,  illustrated in an example  in Chapter 3,
which tends to cause confusion and frustration  among patients,  is common  in those health facilities where
there are separate medical  departments,  each with its own budget and waiver policy.  A somewhat broader
waiver but one that  is still short term in nature  is that which is provided for the treatment of a specific
illness episode, covering  all inputs and services given to the patient during that episode, but expiring once
the treatment  is completed.  Prospective  patients must reapply for a waiver  in the future to treat new
illness episodes.  Long-tenm waivers are those awarded to individuals with a validity of one year or more,
including those that are indefinite.  In some countries the handicapped  or the elderly are entitled to
permanent waivers  in certain health  facilities.
Extent of waiver.  Waivers may be full or partial.  A full waiver entitles  its beneficiary to obtain for free
the services it covers;  a partial waiver may require  of the applicant a partial payment, that is, one below
the full price.  Chile's National Health Fund confers full waivers to indigent beneficiaries, but has a
sliding fee scale for non-indigent  beneficiaries,  thus granting a price subsidy that decreases with income.
Thailand's fonner low income card system (LICS) fully exempted the poor from payment in health
facilities.
Table 2 Waivers  and  exemptions: design and  implementation  issues
Waiver  Exemption
Resource  availability
What amount  of resources is available to finance waivers/exemptions?  X  X
General  design and  implementation
Is user fee policy effectively used to further objectives of waivers/exemptions policy?  X  X
Which services are waived or exempted?  X  X
Who is entitled to a waiver?  X
At which  level of health system is waiver/exemption  provided?  X  X
On what basis is waiver provided (individual assessment, group, self-selection)?  X
How well informed are implementers  about waiver/exemption  policy?  X  X
If waiver provided  on individual basis, what kind individual assessment method  is  used
(means test, proxy means test)?  X
Who provides waivers?  X
Is waiver provided on an individual or a family basis?  X
Is a  systenm of identification cards used?  X
Are identification criteria revised regularly?  X
How long is  waiver good for?  X
Supply-side design and  implementation  features
Are providears  compensated for revenue forgone?  X  X
What paynient mechanism is used to compensate providers?  X  X
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What is the significance of compensation  relative to customary fees and to actual cost?  X  X
How timely is compensation?  X  X
Does compensation cover administrative costs?  X  X
Are  compensation amounts revised regularly to keep up with costs?  X  X
Is user fee revenue  kept at facility?  X  X
Is staff income tied to user fee revenue?  X  X
Are  records kept on  user fee revenue and on waivers and exemptions provided?  X  X
Demand-side  design and  implementation  features
How well disseminated is waiver/exemption  policy?  X  X
Do  agents responsible for providing waivers actively screen for potential beneficiaries or do
they passively wait for them?  X
When  is waiver provided  ex-ante, when service is demanded,  or ex-post?  X
How important is  social stigma?  X  X
Are beneficiaries discriminated (i e,  are they mistreated or treated differently)?  X  X
How accessible are services for non-beneficiaries?  X  X
How well informed are potential  beneficiaries about policy?  X  X
What is the magnitude of individual access costs to the system?  X  X
Does program finance all or part of patients' access costs?  X  X
What penalties are imposed on those cheating the system?  X
Reach.  A waiver may be provided to some members of the household or to all.  Typically  the latter is
more common, but there are several examples of waiver systems which are provided  at the individual
level -for example a waiver covering a single mother and her child, both of whom live with the mother's
parents, but where these do not qualify for a waiver.
Who provides program  benefits?  Do protection mechanisms restrict the set of providers where program
benefits are delivered or can beneficiaries freely select their providers?  In Colombia the beneficiaries of
the  Subsidized  Regime get a demand subsidy from the municipal govemment that allows them to enroll
with a public or with a private health insurer of their choice.  But they can obtain health services only
from those providers that have a contract agreement with their insurer.  Chile's National Health Fund
entitles its higher income beneficiaries  to a partial waiver for private health services.  Beneficiaries  can
freely select the provider from a broad  list established by FONASA.  In Honduras,  beneficiaries  of the
Matemal  and Child Food Coupon program can receive health benefits financed by the program only from
public facilities,  but they can redeem the food coupon  in any private grocery store.
Financing of waived  benefits.  Up to here all issues in this section have dealt with the process of
identifying beneficiaries and managing the waiver process.  A distinct but equally critical  component of a
waiver system is its financing.  A successful waiver program requires that the value of the services
waived equal the funding available  for the program.  Such a balance is seldom contemplated  in the design
of a waiver policy and thus rarely holds.  As already noted, achieving that balance requires  knowledge
about the number of beneficiaries  of the waiver program, their demand for the waived services, and the
production cost of the services.  These information  requirements increase with the number and
complexity of the services included in the waiver program.  Lack of clarity about funding needs  for a
waiver program often means that financing is  insufficient and that the rationing of services  emerges as the
de facto tool which imposes a balance.  For example, Guatemala's Coverage Extension Program
implemented  in the late  1990s sought to deliver about 15 different  kinds of preventive and primary health
services free of charge to rural poor populations through provision  contracts with NGOs.  Poor prior
knowledge about actual delivery costs meant that the program  was underfinanced  and as a consequence
only few of the services contained in the basic package of 15  interventions were actually delivered to the
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success.
Provider compensation.  Does the provider of services get financial  compensation from the program  for
the delivery  of subsidized services to beneficiaries  of protection programs? Or does it have to collect
revenue  from non-program  customers to cover program costs?  Or does it have to ration delivery and limit
free care to live with its limited existing budget?  Many waiver programs fail because they do not fully
compensate providers for the revenue they forego by delivering free services to program beneficiaries
(see examples in Chapter 3).  Compensation  obviously requires knowledge  about production costs and the
existence oi a payment system through which the waiver program channels funds to the provider.  Which
payment system is chosen has implications for the performance of the waiver program.  For example, if
fee-for-service  is selected, and if the fee reflects full marginal cost, then the provider will have an
incentive to provide free care to beneficiaries.  In an attempt to boost revenue,  it may also attempt to give
free care to non-beneficiaries, if the reimbursement  is higher than the regular price, and to bill the
financing agency for it.  To avoid cost escalation, the financing agency may have to impose a budget
ceiling for the payment of waived services.  Capitation,  in contrast, consists of the periodic payment to the
provider of a fixed amount of money for each registered beneficiary of the waiver program.  Since this
payment is not tied to the volume of services actually delivered, the incentive of the provider may be to
under-provide  free care -just  the opposite effect of fee-for-service  payment.  The selection of an
appropriate  payment system has been the subject of a recent debate in the context of Cambodia's  equity
funds (Knowles 2001; Bitran 2002).
Protection with specific benefits versus unconditioned cash transfers  Do the benefits of protection
programs come  in the form of free or subsidized health  services, or do they come in the form of income
supplements -cash-  which beneficiaries  can use freely, on health services or on other consumption?
2.3  Performance  of protection mechanisms
Assessing the performance  of a protection mechanism should  be an integral part of a poor-protection
policy.  Questions to be asked include the following (see Table 3): Are the intended beneficiaries  actually
protected; has there been an increase  in their use of health  care services; are some non-poor
inappropriately  benefiting from the protection?  What is the actual administrative cost of the protection
mechanism'?  How efficient is the protection mechanism,  in terms of the ratio between the protection
granted and the administrative  costs of this protection?  What are the outcomes of the program,  in terms
of better health status?  Below is a definition of concepts related to performance and a discussion  of
performance  measurement  issues.
Table 3 Monitoring and  evaluation of waiver and exemption  systems
Monitoringl and evaluation issues
Are perforrnance  evaluations conducted  regularly or sporadically?  X  X
Is provider compensation system working effectively and  is compensation amount in
accordanos with the actual cost of service?  X  X
Are  prospective beneficiaries actually waived?  X
Do waived beneficiaries make greater use of services than poor, non-waived individuals?  X
Do the beneficianes of waivers get financial protection?  X
Is there an increase  in  utilization of exempt services?  X
(a)  Errors and accuracy  in beneficiary identification
A successful  beneficiary identification  program is one that identifies those in need of protection with
precision,  neitlher missing any of those in the target group nor allowing any benefits to go to those outside
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two following possible types of errors (it is assumed that those needing protection are the poor, as will
almost always be the case for social programs  such as basic health care):
To classify as non-poor someone  who is truly poor.  This means denying protection  to someone who
deserves or requires it.  This kind of inaccuracy is called a Type I error  (also known as a false negative) or
"under-coverage".  Type I errors can arise from an overly stringent screening mechanism, from the
reluctance of potential beneficiaries to be tagged  as poor, or from lack of knowledge among prospective
beneficiaries  about the program.  Reducing Type I errors promotes equity by improving access to social
services by the poor.
To classify  as poor someone who is not poor.  This implies that protection is awarded to non-target
individuals.  This type of mistake  is generally referred to as a Type II error  (also known as a false
positive), and more commonly called "leakage".
Figure  10 summarizes the four possible outcomes of a beneficiary  identification  effort. The accuracy of
the method can be calculated  in terms of Type I and Type II errors.  Both types of error can be expressed
either as the number of misclassified  people or as amounts of money over or under spent.  The extent of
Type I error or under-coverage  is measured by dividing the number of poor wrongly excluded  from the
benefits by the total number of poor.  It can also be measured by dividing the value of benefits wrongly
denied by the amount of money required to provide benefits to all of  the poor.  Grosh  (1992a)  states "The
complement of under-coverage  is coverage,  or the percent of those who ought to be served who are
served.  This is sometimes called the participation  rate".  Type  11  error or leakage  is measured by dividing
the number of non-poor beneficiaries  by the total number of beneficiaries,  or the value of benefits
wrongly awarded to the non-poor (upper right quadrant)  by the total value of benefits (upper left and right
quadrants).
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(b)  Accuracy-cost tradeoff in beneficiary identification
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to zero while reaching all target beneficiaries.  In practice,  however, this is seldom possible.  The more
accurate  a beneficiary  identification effort
is, the higher its coverage (smallest Type I  Figure  10 Tradeoff between  accuracy  and cost of
error) and the lower its leakage (minimal  targeting
Type II error).  Achieving a high degree of  Q
accuracy  however requires costly  t  o
information  gathering and compliance  E  targetmgI
efforts to identify intended beneficiaries  f  j  Program benes
and exclude the rest.  s  I  tet  pou  ion
This tradeoff between the identification  _  T  I
effort and the incidence of the program  is
illustrated  in Figure  I0.'°  Consider a  c  ,
subsidized  health program, worth $T  E  Program  benefits
million, dehvered without any targeting  A  going to t  ta  t
effort.  Universal, free-of-direct-charge  I
provision ofigovernment-financed  services
is an example.  In the absence of a  MlmwII  M  MSt3m
targeting effort, part of the  subsidy, or the  Targeting effort
amount  A  in thte figure, will reach the intended population group (defined, for example, as the poorest 40
percent of the population); and, because of a lack of targeting, part of the subsidy, equal to Be, will leak
out to the non-poor,  such that A+B=T.
If an effort were made to identify target beneficiaries -for example those below a certain  income or
socioeconomic  status threshold- the amount of subsidy reaching the poor would increase from  its original
value of A, while the subsidies reaching the non-poor would decrease from the initial value of B.  But at
the same time, a new cost, the administrative cost of the beneficiary  identification program,  begins to eat
up part of the total subsidy amount available.  For a while, the greater the identification  effort, the larger
the volume of subsidies that reaches the poor, the smaller the share of the subsidy that filters to the non-
poor, and the higher the share of the total subsidy that is devoted to the  identification  effort.  If the effort
were maximum (right-hand  side of the figure), that is if somehow program personnel were able to identify
with precision all target and non-target beneficiaries, then there would no longer be any leakage  of
program resources:  subsidies would be divided into benefits going to target beneficiaries  and costs of the
targeting effort.
But with a decreasing marginal  return of identification,  engaging in the highest possible identification
effort clearly vvould not be optimal, because the share of program benefits going to the poor would not be
maximal.  A smaller beneficiary  identification  effort, or optimum, denoted by M in the figure, would be
preferred:  a maximum of benefits equal to the distance MN would go the to poor, a total of resources
equal to NL would leak to the non-poor, and an amount equal to LQ would be eaten up by the
identification  effort." 
Both accuracy  and costs determine the efficiency of beneficiary identification.  Thus, the most accurate
strategy is not necessarily the most efficient because  it might entail high costs.  The  "output" to be
produced as efficiently as possible is defined by the policy objective (for example, providing the biggest
transfer to the poor).  In this case, the most efficient targeting strategy is the one that transfers the largest
10  This scheme  has been suggested  by Willis (1993)
It has bieen suggested that to gain political support for a targeted  program sometimes it  is necessary to allow some
leakage.
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form of leakage to the non-poor.
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3  Empirical evidence on protection
mechanisms
3.1  Introdujction
Chapter 1 was a conceptual discussion of user fees in health and their likely effect on the poor.  Chapter 2
examined theoretical  ways of preserving  equitable access to health care when user fees are in place.  This
third chapter offers information from  seven countries on their actual experience with protection
mechanisms.  Criteria for choosing a case include novelty, success or failure of protection mechanisms,
diversity  in socioeconomic circumstances,  and availability of data.  Gathering sufficient information to
write a case was a demanding task, as sources are dispersed and often informal.  Most cases were written
on the basis of multiple sources, written and oral.  Table 4 presents a list of selected indicators  for case
study countries,  with the countries organized in ascending order of purchase-power-adjusted  per capita
GDP (1997).  The cases that follow are presented in the same order, each  with the following common
structure: (a) context; (b) user fee policies; (c) protection  mechanisms; (d) results (e)  lessons leamed for
case study countries  and for others wishing to implement protection mechanisms.
Table 4 Selected  indicators, case study countries*
Kenya  Cambodia  Ghana  Zimbabwe  Indonesia  Thailand  Chile
Demographic  indicators
Total population  2001  (millions)  298  13 1  19 9  11  4  206 1  624  154
Life expectancy at birth 1999 (years)  47 7  53 7  57 9  40 4  65.7  6&6  75 5
Urban population 1999 (percent)  32 2  15 6  37 9  34 6  39.8  21  3  85 4
Economic indicators
GDP growth  raite  1997 (percent)  2.1  1  0  4 2  2 8  4.7  -1.5  7 4
Per capita GDi  1997 (1995  PPP $)  1,020  1,330  1,760  2,680  3,130  6,440  8,440
Poverty indicators
Year  1992  1999  1992  1990  1999  1998  1994
Population uncler poverty line, Total (percent)  42 0  35 9  31  4  25 5  23 4  12 8  23 2
Rural  469  252  343  310  195  172  218
Urban  29 3  40.0  26 7  10.0  26 1  1 5  30 6
Health expenditure
Per capda health expenditure  1997 (current PPP $)  81  96  54  186  55  347  533
Private health expenditure as percentage  of total 1997  35 9  90 6  53  38 2  47 4  65.4  48 6
Structure of health expenditure  1997 (percent of GDP)
Private  54  64  1 6  3.7  1 1  39  3 1
Public  2.4  0 7  1.4  2 9  0 6  1 8  3
Total  78  71  30  66  17  57  61
Organized  in ascending order of PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in 1997
Data from World Bank World Development  Indicators, 2000/2001  and WHO Report 2000, unless otherwise noted
Data on  poverty for Chile was obtained from USAID,  1998
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(a)  Context
Kenya is the poorest country of the selected case studies. Forty-two percent of its population lives below
the national  poverty line (World Development Indicators,  2001).  In 1997, total health expenditure was
7.8 percent of GDP. Kenya relies heavily on private expenditure which represents  70 percent of total
health expenditure.  A severe economic crisis in  the early  1990s led to a steady decrease of government
allocations to health, from $29 per capita in 1990 to $17 in 1993.  By 1998, total public per capita
expenditure  in health had returned to its pre-crisis  level of $30.
(b)  User-fee  policy and  its impact on the poor
Beginning with independence  in 1963,  Kenya committed itself to free public education and health care.
Owing to the economic crises of the late  1980s, however,  in 1989 the country introduced cost-sharing
policies to raise revenues in outpatient wards in hospitals and in health centers. Over time, user fee
revenues have increased  substantially from Ksh.  28 million in FY  1990/91, to Ksh. 325 million in FY
1998-99 (Table  5). In FY 98/99 they accounted for 3.4 percent of non-wage recurrent health expenditures
(Owino, 2000).'3
Table 5  Kenya:  Cost-sharing revenue  as a percentage  of Ministry of Health's recurrent
expenditure
Cost sharing  Cost sharing  MOH  recurrent  MOH recurrent
revenue  revenue  expenditure  expenditure
Fiscal year  (Ksh. millions)  ($ millions)  (Ksh. millions)  ($  millions)  Percentage
1990/91  28  1 1  3,040  117  092
1991/92  34  1.1  3,500  116  0.97
1992/93  61  1.4  4,580  102  1 33
1993/94  130  2.3  5,900  103  2 20
1994/95  238  4 4  7,420  138  3 21
1995/96  200  3.7  8,280  153  2 42
1996/97  205  3 6  8,760  152  2.34
1997/98  186  3.1  9,100  152  2.04
1998/99  325  4.7  9,620  140  3 38
Source:  Owino,  1998.
Note.  The figures exclude contributions by Kenyatta National  Hospital
Government health facilities  have established official fees that are in principle uniform across the country
and set nationally by the Ministry of Health (MOH).  In practice, however, responding to declining
government  budget allocations and inflation,  several District Health Management Boards have increased
their fees without prior consultation with or approval  from the MOH, resulting  in  wide divergence
between official and actual fees (Error! Reference  source  not found.,  from  Owino  1999).
There is evidence that cost recovery may be adversely affecting access by the poor and that in some cases
it may have had a negative impact on efficiency of health service provision.  A study by Moses (1992)
covering a nine-month period shows that the introduction of fees for patients attending Nairobi's Special
Treatment  Clinic for sexually transmitted  diseases (STDs) resulted in a 40 percent drop in attendance by
men and a 65 percent drop by women. Another study by Osuga and Nordberg (1993) examines the
12  Information  for this case  study is  drawn  mainly from  Owino,  1998,  1999,  and 2000,  IPAR policy brief,  1999 and
Newbrander  1995
13 . When  Kenyatta  Hospital is  included this percentage  rises to 14 5 percent for FY 94/95
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fees at a rural  ihospital, two health centers and  Figure  10 Kenya: Official and  actual fees  in MOH
two dispensaries  in Kibwezi Division in  facilities, 1994 (KSH)
Machakos D)istrict in Kenya.  Relative to
previous years  when services were free,  T
outpatient attendance dropped significantly  Mortuary
(ranging from 28 percent to 50 percent)  in the  Circumcision
first six months at all fee charging facilities.  Physiotherapy  Actual Fee
Admissions for inpatient care increased  at the  Pharmacy-drugs  e
hospital but length  of stay fell, while  in health  X-ray Code F
centers admissions,  length of stay, and  X-rayCodeA  offiaal Fee
deliveries  declined. Attendance at those  Lab  Test/Specialized
services that continued to be free remained  Theatre/Minor Surgery  _  _
stable or increased slightly at the hospital,  but  Normal delivery  l  _
at health centers trends were mixed, with  Matemity ward
declining  use of under-fives care and ante-
natal care and increased  use of family  Ksh.
planning services.  The drop in attendance
was followed  by a recovery,  but levels remained 20 percent to 40 percent below pre-fee  levels. Similarly,
Mwabu and WVang'ombe  (1995)  show that the introduction of outpatient fees in Kenya's public hospitals
brought about a substantial  drop in demand.  Finally according to a 1995 analysis of household interview
data by Newbrander and colleagues (2000), 91  percent of poor households reported that they knew of
someone who recently had not sought care because of inability to pay.  Sixty percent of respondents
reported that finances were a major factor behind the drop in demand in government  facilities; 30 percent
cited dissatisfaction  with the service provider or service quality as  a reason for seeking alternative
treatments.
(c)  Protection mechanisms
In an effort to mitigate the negative effects of user fees on access by the poor, MOH central level staff
introduced  a system of exemptions for certain categories of persons or patients afflicted  with certain
illnesses.  Since  1992 exemption  categories have been reduced  (Table 6).  For example, whereas before
1995  children under 5 years were waived from fees in all primary care facilities,  after 1998 only about
one-half of all facilities kept this waiver.
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  30Facility staff (medical  superintendents,  matrons,  Table  6 Kenya:  Categories  of patients and
hospital secretaries,;or administrative  officers)  illnesses  exempted,  1989-98
determines waivers locally and grant them to the
poor on the basis of income and health status.  0-15  yrs  0-5  yrs  0-5 yrs1
Initially, local  leaders and their assistants were  in  Prisoners  Yes  Yes  Yes
charge of screening and recommending  patients  Tuberculosis  (TB)  patients  Yes  Yes  Yes
for waivers. This process was deemed prone to  Leprosy patients  Yes  Yes  Yes
political  interference and led to delays in  Patients from
treatment (Owino,  1999).  Also at the beginning  charitable/destitute homes  Yes  Yes  Yes
of this policy, the MOH published rules for  Family Planning  Yes  Yes  -
establishing eligibility on the basis of income,  STDeAIDS  Yes  Yes  -
but the rules proved difficult to interpret and  Unemployed  (certified by their)
implement. Measuring  individual and family  District Officer  Yes  Yes  -
cash income constituted a major hurdle leading  Antenatal and postnatal clinics  Yes  Yes  -
health staff to use income proxies for waiver  Civil  servants  Yes
eligibility.  A study of 9 facilities shows that in  Unmarried children  under age
22 (except for inpatient charges)  Yes
practice  a wide variety of proxies are  tused. Also,  Source  Owino,  1999
facilities seem to combine different patient  Notes
attributes to determine poverty (for example  'Yes'  if  category included in  the exemption list sometime dunng mode  of ranspor  to hosptal andcorresponding period
clothing, mode of transport to hospital and  Children  under 5 exempted in  50 percent of facilities visited,
number of relatives accompanying the patient,  though benefits were restricted to consultations.  Plans  reportedly
Table 7).'4 Some criteria -such as occupation,  underway to remove this group from exemption list (Owino,  1999)
clothing, and hairstyles-  seem common to all facilities, whereas others -number of dependents to family
size, relationship with accompanying family members- are used only by a few entities.
The staff issuing waivers is  Table 7 Kenya: Eligibility criteria for waivers  in selected  MOH
required to fill out a standard  health care facilities
MOH waiver form and  Facility
forward it to the medical  Attributes  relating to the patient  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
superintendent  or his or her  Occupation  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
delegate for approval. The  Mode of dressing/hairstyles  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
administrative  process  Mode of transport to hospital  X  X  X
involved in granting  waivers  Recommendation  by local administration  X  X  X  X  X
Direct observation  X  X  X  X  X  X IS  cumbersome, on average  Drc  bevto 
Number of dependents/family  size  X  X
lasting about 1-2  hours.  Nature and  type of relatives  X  X
When the local  Number and type of accompanying  family
administration  is involved,  members  x  x  x  x  x  x
the approval process  Length of stay after discharge*  X  X  X  X
sometimes may take up to a  Recommendation  by social worker  x  x  x
Source:  Owino,  1998
a full day.  Often the process  Notes:
is hampered  by the lack of  'X"  means attribute used at facility for eligibility assessment (Owino,  1999)
adequate stationery and  *  When  patients did  not pay the bill they were not allowed to leave the health facility
qualified staff. Nurses, clinical and medical workers, and other professional staff are usually in charge of
granting waivers,  an activity that interferes and competes with their regular health care duties. The
process of assessing and exempting  patients is thereby often delayed or postponed.  No explicit policy is
in place to compensate facilities for revenue foregone due to waivers and exemptions, and thus more
waivers and exemptions mean less revenue  for the facilities.
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There is no systematic government monitoring or evaluation of the performance  of protection
mechanisms,  and therefore there is a lack of data on coverage of the target group.  A recent survey of 17
facilities reported by Owino (1999) shows that waivers rarely exceeded 2 persons per month -an
insignificant figure given that 42 percent of Kenyans live below the poverty line.  Beneficiaries  of
exemptions  and waivers are mainly inpatients and outpatients with simple medical conditions and seldom
include patients with costly treatments. This finding may reflect the reluctance of providers to forego
significant r evenue though costly exemptions.  It also indicates a situation where exemptions are absent
where they are most needed: costly treatments  have the most detrimental  impact on the poor. The low
level of exemptions contrasts with the high prevalence of poverty;  it reveals the existence of serious
problems of under-coverage, and thus points to major deficiencies with this protection mechanism.
In a survey conducted by Owino (1998)  80 percent of inpatients and 86 percent of outpatients were not
aware of waivers and exemptions.  Even those who did know about them were unclear about eligibility
criteria.  Staff attitude towards waivers and exemptions was usually negative and they have been reluctant
to publicize protection mechanisms.  Fearing revenue losses, staff felt that information  on waivers should
not be easily accessible to patients and that patient relatives should assume the burden of fees. In fact,
according to COwino,  there seems to be a general reluctance  by facilities to create  awareness about the
waiver system.  In the same study, about 70 percent of the facility clerks interviewed  were against
publicizing the system.
There have also been reports of leakage, especially  in the form of exemptions for civil servants and health
personnel (Ow ino,  1999).  According to a study by Newbrander (1995),  only one-third of all waivers and
exemptions  were accounted for by the poor, and a full two-thirds  accrued to the non-poor.  Leakage from
waivers through individual targeting did not seem to be a problem.  Based on a one-day exit interview,
Newbrander reports that  100 percent of waivers granted through individual targeting were given to the
poor.  Still, theire seems to be other evidence of corrupt practices in the granting of waivers and
exemptions  C)wino (1999) reports that nurses  in charge  of wards were known to seek bribes  in exchange
for helping patients abscond without paying or for getting preferential  treatment in the fee-determination
process. It seems also to be common practice that health staff benefits from waivers and exemptions
alleging that their salaries are too low.
(e)  Lessons learned
User fees resulted in a sizable  drop in demand  in hospitals, and the poor reported access problems related
to the imposition of user fees.  Measures to preserve access by the poor through waivers and exemptions
are characterized  by under-coverage  and leakage.  Factors responsible for this poor performance  include
the following:
*  Lack of clear guidelines to determine eligibility.
*  Absence  of staff incentives  to grant and promote exemptions  and  waivers,  including  the  lack of
mechanisms  for compensating health facilities for revenue foregone.
*  The  protection  system  has not  accounted  for administrative  costs involved  in  granting waivers.
The  approval  and  granting  of waivers  and  exemptions  is  hampered  by  the  lack  of adequate
stationery  and  qualified  administrative  staff -medical  social  workers.  This  lack of specialized
staff has  required that  waiver functions  be undertaken  by nurses,  clinical  and  medical  officers,
thus  interfering  with  their  medical  duties  and  hampering  the  effectiveness  of  the  waiver
procedure.
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mechanisms.
*  Perceived  low quality of services by all prospective  patients, including the poor.




Cambodia is emerging from decades of civil war and unrest.  It is estimated that between one-fourth and
one-third of Cambodia's population died during the war, from violence and starvation.  Since the early
1990s Cambodia has begun to rebuild  its economy,  achieving significant economic growth  rates, and the
government has pledged to improve the provision of social services.  Still, Cambodia remains a very poor
nation with a national prevalence  of poverty of 36 percent and with a high concentration  of poverty in
rural areas.  Meager public budgets for health have done little to reduce reliance of user fees in the public
system and to alleviate the burden that fees represent for the poor.
(b)  User fee  policy
Cambodia's  health sector relies heavily for its financing on private  payments for health care.  Knowles
(2001) states that
Overall  health  sector funding  in  Cambodia  absorbed  12-13  percent  of  GDP  in  1996-97,  by far  the
highest  share  among  Asian  developing  countries.  Another  striking  feature  of  the  financing  of
Cambodia's  health  sector  is  the  large  role  played  by out-of-pocket  household  expenditures,  which
accounted  for  82-84  percent  of  total  sector  financing  during  the  same  period.  In  contrast,  the
government plays a relatively  minor role  in sector financing,  accounting for  only about 4-5 percent  of
the  total.  Official donor  assistance  (ODA)  and  direct funding  by  NGOs also contribute  significantly to
sector financing, accounting for about 8-12 and 2-3 percent respectively of total sector financing during
this period.
According  to the  1996 Health Care Demand  Study, on average health care accounted for 22 percent of all
estimated household expenditures. This percentage increased  with income, except for the poorest families
that devoted 28 percent of their total spending to health care.  In 1996 the monthly mean expenditure on
health care per household was estimated at $13.90 (MOH / WHO / GTZ,  1998:20); adjusted by internal
inflation this was equivalent to $27.10 per person per year in  1  999.15
The World Bank (2001) carried out an analysis of affordability of government-provided  health services,
by expressing health care spending in relation to household  non-food expenditure per capita (a proxy for
discretionary household income).  They concluded that health care was extremely expensive for the poor.
One outpatient visit to an ambulatory government facility cost $30.00, or the equivalent of one-third of a
year's non-food spending for those in the poorest expenditure quintile;  one hospital admission cost on
average  $87.00, or more than twice the average  annual nonfood spending.
In  1996 the MOH  introduced the National Charter on Health  Financing (NCHF).  This initiative sought to
formalize cost recovery  in the form of user fees around the country.  The NCHF also made possible the
15 . The Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey of 1997 found that health expenditure per household was US$18 60 per month,
equivalent to a per capita out-of-pocket expenditure per year of US$42
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with the explicit  purpose of "increasing financial resources to the sector and obtaining better value for
money"  (National Charter on Health  Financing in the Kingdom of Cambodia,  1996:2). Three  specific
goals were implicit  in this statement: to reduce unofficial charges  and household  out-of-pocket
expenditures;  to improve quality of care through increased and timely availability of medical supplies;
and to motivale staff through performance-related  payments funded by fees. In accordance  with the third
goal, the government  defined a revenue allocation rule whereby 49 percent of user-fee revenue could be
used to improve salaries,  50 percent could be devoted to pay for the facility's non-salary operating costs,
and a nominal  1 percent must be transferred  to the National Treasury.  Under the HCFC, therefore,
facilities retain and control locally 99 percent of all user fee revenue.
(c)  Protection mechanisms
Exemptions from payment in health facilities are not common in Cambodia, although most public
facilities do provide them according to some ad-hoc procedures.  The World Bank (1999) reported that in
1997 only about  18 percent of users of health care services were exempted  from fees around the country,
and noted that individuals  from higher income households were more likely to get exempted  from user
fees than the poor.
A major obstacle to acceptable  levels of exemptions,  i.e.,  ones consistent with Cambodia's  high levels of
poverty,  is the conflict that exists between  health staff income and their awarding of exemption  to
patients.  The average  staff of a government health facility earns a monthly salary of between $10 and
$15.  This income  level is below the poverty line.  To subsist, government  health workers depend heavily
on revenue from user fees and from other remunerated  activities.  In interviews with facility health staff in
three provinces (Takeo, Sotnikum, Kandal)  and the capital city of Phnom Penh, Bitran (2002) found that
owing to cost recovery from user fees, the average monthly income of a government  health worker may
be as much as $180, of which  less than  10 percent comes from its official salary, and the rest from user
fees.  Wilkinson et al. (2001) note the following:
There  is an inherent  tension  in a facility seeking  to operate  a viable  exemption  scheme and  a viable
salary  incentive  scheme.  The  two  systems are  essentially in competition,  especially  in facilities  which
are  operating  at,  or near to full  capacity.  In  this  situation,  every  exemption  provided  is effectively  paid
for  by  the  staff themselves  from  their  salary  uplift.  If, as  in Takeo,  the  hospital  is  operating  at  full
capacity,  and  is striving  towards  improving  efficiency,  then  granting  exemptions  would  be  virtually
intolerable  Ironically,  exemptions  are more  likely  to  be granted in facilities which  are  performing  less
well,  and where  serving  a patient  for free does not necessarily  mean  excluding  a fee-paying  patient.
The  competition,  outlined  above,  between  patients  for  more  exemptions  and  staff for greater  salary
incentives  is  actually part of a broader systemic tension,  inherent in the design of the health  financing
scheme,  between  equity  and  efficiency.  There  is  a  real  danger that  increasing  equity,  by  lowering
prices  and providing  more  exemptions to the  poor,  will  undermine  efficiency,  both at facility  level  and
[Operation  District]  O.D.  level. Conversely,  as facilities  strive towards  greater efficiency,  there  is a real
danger that the poor  will  become  even  more  marginalized.  If  the tensions  outlined  above  are to be
relieved, it  is clear that the mechanism  for financing exemptions must be completely separated from the
mechanism  for financing salary supplements  and operating  costs.
Exemption  policies vary widely among provinces and districts  in Cambodia (Espinosa and Bitran 2000).
For example in  1999 one-fourth of the population under the responsibility of Rovieng health center was
waived from fees.  By contrast,  at Pereang operational  district the rule is that no waiver is granted, except
in very special cases.  The policy, there, is to keep fees low enough to make everybody pay while at the
same time avoiding problems of financial accessibility for the poor.  In Takeo Hospital, the rate of
waivers was estimated as 2 percent while at Pursat Hospital the value of waivers accounted  for  13 to 15
percent of cost recovery revenue (Pursat Report on user fee payments, January 2000).
Aside from the system of informal waivers already discussed,  two interesting  formal models exist in
Cambodia for promoting equitable access to health services by the poor: the Calmette Hospital model  and
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autonomous,  250-bed public facility located  in Phnom Penh that provides health  services free of charge to
the poor and that gets reimbursed for it by the government on the basis of a fixed payment of $26.00 per
hospitalization.  A special mechanism  known as Chapter 31  (a budget line  item reserved  for social
allowances for health staff), operating exclusively  in Calmette, makes this protection system possible.
Calmette has a formal  fee schedule for non-poor patients and a formal means testing mechanism for
classifying patients into the paying and exempt categories on arrival.  Calmette devotes about one-third of
its beds to indigent care.  Occupancy rates are  65 percent for paying beds and  100 percent for the beds
devoted to the poor.  Calmette Hospital  also receives financial and technical  support from the French
Cooperation,  an agency that is currently seeking  government approval for expanding the Calmette model
to six other hospitals, of which two are  in Phnom Penh and four in the provinces.  Unfortunately,  tight
public budgets make this prospect unlikely and government officials seem unwilling to generalize or
expand this system.
Equity funds were conceived in Cambodia to finance the cost of health services provided at no charge or
at reduced prices to the poor.  Unlike the Calmette model, which so far remains  a single exception,  the
EFs model  is likely to become more widespread.  An upcoming World Bank loan may promote and
finance EF expansion.  The basic mode of operation of an EF is illustrated  in Figure  11.  The process of
setting up an EF begins with the submission  by the health facility to the MOH of an application  for
approval of its health financing charter, including its fee schedule  (Action  1).  Once the charter is
approved by the MOH (Action 2), the facility officially adopts  its fee schedule (Action 3), including some
criteria to waive the poor.  The MOH,  in turn, quantifies the budget for the health  facility, in principle
taking into account the provider's expected ability to generate  complementary revenue  from users (Action
4).  Patients arriving in the facility (Action 5) and wishing to be waived from fees are subject to a means
test to determine their eligibility (Action  6).  Patients applying but found not eligible for waivers, along
with patients not applying for waivers (Action 7), are subject to and must pay the provider's customary
fees (Action 8).  Exempt patients,  instead, are offered care for free or at a reduced price (Action 9).
Periodically the health facility reports to the EF on the level of  waivers provided as well as on the
monetary value equivalent of the subsidized services (Action  10).  For example, the provider may keep a
record of all services delivered for free and then, based on the user fee revenue foregone, at established
prices, it bills the EF.  The latter in turn reimburses the provider, after controlling and approving the
statement submitted by the provider (Action  11).  The EF requires a periodic refill of its fund (Action  12),
which gets depleted with the reimbursements to the provider.  EF financing has been,  until now, the role
of donors (e.g., the Swiss Red Cross  in Takeo Hospital, the U.K.  and Save the Children in  Sotnikum, and
the U.K.  in the Phnom Penh Urban Health Project), but there is nothing in the design that would preclude
the government from financing EFs.
Not all EFs operate in exactly the same way; there are variations  which may have important behavioral
implications and consequences on the performance of the health system.  They include the management
of the waiver process; where lies the responsibility to establish  eligibility; the method used to pay the
provider; the insertion of EF in referral  system; and the type and extent of financial protection.
Waivers may be managed either by health staff, as in Takeo Hospital, or by the combined and coordinated
work of health staff and EF clerks, as in Sotnikum and the Phnom Penh Urban Health Project (PPHUP).
In  Sotnikum, for example, health staff in the referral hospital  first detects  signs of indigence among
patients,  and then refer these patients to the EF for a means test.  Likewise, the responsibility to determine
eligibility may be in the hands of EF clerks, health staff, or both.  In Sotnikum the ultimate decision about
the granting of waivers rests with a specially trained professional  who carries out a formal means test of
applicants.  Also in Sotnikum EF staff visit patients  in their homes after discharge, to confirm the
information  provided during the means test.
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Providers may be given a fixed budget to finance waivers, as in Takeo or in the PPUHP, or they may get
paid by the EF on a fee-for-service or per case basis,  as in Sotnikum.  The EF may promote patient flow
through the referral  system as in PPUHP, where patients seen  in health rooms who need a referral  get a
waiver for the fees associated with health services required at the higher level.  In  Sotnikum, instead, as in
Takeo,  exempl ions are  granted when patients show up in the hospital, because the EF there does not
operate at, or in coordination with the primary care facilities.
The extent of protection  afforded by the EF varies as well, in terms of the types of  services  it covers and
the proportion of the services'  costs it pays for.  Thus, an EF could in principle provide protection against
catastrophic  health problems (none does so far), or it could finance all or part of the costs of an episode of
illness.  All three EFs studied by Bitran (2002) provide financial protection  for high-cost services  in
hospitals, but they have implicit or explicit  limits in what they cover and therefore may not be providing
true catastrophic coverage.  Aside from the extent of coverage  of health expenditures, EFs may or may
not cover other health-related  expenses,  such as transportation  to and from the health facility, food for the
patient and family members, and the like.  Hardeman  (2001) examined this issue,  among other aspects of
EF, through  a case study in Sotnikum.  He examined  a sample of 51  individuals who had been
hospitalized  in June-July 2001  to assess patient expenditures and  level of patient financial support, if any,
by Sotnikum's EF.  He found that among the poor and the very poor, the highest expenditure associated
with a hospitalization  was food, on average varying in the range 38-42 percent (Figure 11).
Hospitalization  fees were the second most important  patient expenditure, representing  about 32-35
percent of all expenses.  Transport costs were the third most important category and accounted  for just
below 20 percent. Other expenses represented  8 percent.  Whereas  Sotnikum's EF supported all four
kinds of patient expenditure,  the structure of its support did not match that of patient spending:  one-half
of  the aid was directed toward hospitalization  fees and one-third toward transport expenses.  Only 5
percent of the average support to patients was devoted to food outlays.  In absolute terms, the average
support per patient amounted to $10.00, and covered the bulk of hospital  fees and transport costs.  Total
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Hardeman  (2001),  who evaluated the Sotnikum EF,  provided an equally upbeat vision.  He found that the
EF improved equity in access to health services by not discriminating  in the provision of care between  the
poor and the non-poor.  The cost of supporting each hospitalized  patient was, on average $10, making it
possible  for poor and near poor patients to receive medical  services worth  $50 ($10 co-financing  by the
EF; $40 financed by the government on average,  through the support of recurrent hospital  expenditures).
He also found that there was virtually no leakage of benefits to the non-poor.  He concurred with
Knowles'  finding about the EF's ability to prevent poverty from high health-related expenditure
households vulnerable to poverty.
(e)  Lessons learned
Hardeman  (2001) identified a number of limitations in the Sotnikum EF model.  First, he noted that the
EF was passive in the sense that it did not actively  search for the poor in need of assistance, but instead
waited for them to show up.  This likely resulted in under-coverage of the poor, a phenomenon that may
be overcome gradually as the EF becomes  known to the local residents.  He reported that an estimated 30-
40 percent of the population was poor or near-poor in Sotnikum  district, but only  15-20 percent of the
hospitalized patients fell in those two categories.  He also concluded that there was a lack of awareness
about the EF, noting that the total number of patients so far receiving EF support (309 people) was still
small in relation to total beneficiary population of 220,000.  He felt, however, that awareness  would
improve  in response to current community involvement in EF promotion.  He also remarked  that the poor
were still subject to financial  uncertainty associated with health care demand, since the outcome of the
means testing procedure was unknown  to them prior to seeking care.  He remained concerned about the
EF's ability to improve accessibility and to have a noticeable  impact on use by the poor.  He also worried
also about the replicability of the EF, particularly  its management structure and its methods for
identifying recipients and paying providers.  A final concern was the ability of future EFs to control  and
maintain appropriate  levels of quality of subsidized  health services.
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support of patient expenditures be removed, that case-based  be maintained as the reimbursement  system
for providers, that a proposal  for the adoption of a flat fee reimbursement  be rejected,  and that the EF
reimburse providers at full cost instead of the current 70 percent of cost.  He also advised that the means
testing procedures  used in the EF to avoid type I errors (wrongly denying benefits to the truly poor) be
discontinued.  Other recommendations  included the addition to EF benefits of vouchers for home-based
obstetric care; the provision of patient partial assistance for referrals to all higher-level facilities; the
continuation of provision by the EF of supplementary welfare  payments to individuals to encourage the
continuity of care in higher level facilities;  the turning over of EF management  to a local NGO; and the
future opening up of the EF to the participation of the non poor in exchange  for a monthly fee.
Main  lessons arising from the Cambodia case follow:
*  EF  seem  to  be  an  effective  mechanism  for targeting  assistance  to poor  individuals  in  need  of
health  care in Cambodia
*  Private patient costs of care  other than the  health professional's  fees and  medicines  can  be quite
substantial;  to be effective,  EFs should  also  contemplate  paying  for such costs as transportation
and food for patients and accompanying relatives.
e  The initial operation of EF has been characterized  by under-coverage.  Further dissemination  of e
EF may lead to greater demand for their assistance.
*  The  provision  by  EF  of  waivers  at  the  time  of care  involves  uncertainty  for  prospective
beneficiaries  who do not always know their chances of getting a waiver.  This may limit demand
for EF assistance  and for health care by the poor.  The possibility of distributing waivers ex-ante
at the household  level should be considered  by those designing EFs.
*  Paying  providers  for the  medical  services  delivered  to  EF  beneficiaries  seems  a  key  factor  in
assuring  access  by  the  poor  to  timely  and  good  quality  care.  Such  a  payment  confers  an
economic  benefit  to providers  which  makes  them  indifferent  between treating  EF  beneficiaries




Ghana's population of 20 million has a PPP-adjusted per capita income of $1,760.  In 1999 per capita
health expenditure was $54.00 (PPP-adjusted) and total health expenditure  amounted to 3  percent of
GDP, with 61  percent being privately financed  mainly through out-of-pocket payments by households.
According to the World Bank (1999), one-third of Ghana's  population lives below the national poverty
line.  In recent  years Ghana has undergone economic difficulties that have led to severe budget constrains
and restricted resources  for health financing.  In the  1990s government  health spending fell both in real
Based on Garshong  Ansah, et al.,  2001; Nyonator and Kutzin 1997,  Nyonator,  Daimenu, Amedo,  and Eleeza,  1996; and
Coleman,  1997
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection mechanisms  38terms and as a percentage of total public expenditure  (from  11.1  percent in  199117 to 4.7 percent in
1998).18
(b)  User-Fee  policy
In  1985  the government  formalized the policy of user fees with the release  of Law 1313  on fee
regulations.  The law specified  fees for most services and called  for full cost recovery for drugs.  In the
following years, drug fees were adjusted annually by inflation whereas all other fees remained  nominally
constant and therefore became  increasingly outdated.  In the time that has elapsed since the inception  of
fees, the real value of official non-drug  fees has dropped by more than 90 percent (Nyonator,  1997).  Prior
to  1983 any revenue generated from user fees by government  health institutions went into a central
government  account.  Since  1983  health facilities have been allowed to retain and spend locally their user
fee revenue.  Proceeds from fees are kept in two separate bank accounts:  one pays for drugs and another
pays for non-drug staff expenses.  Neither account can be used to supplement staff income, an explicit
policy measure seeking to devote fees to the financing of non-personnel quality improvements.
(c)  Protection  mechanisms
Law  1313 provided for waivers for "paupers"  but failed to give an  explicit definition  of such a term and to
include guidelines for the identification of paupers.  The law also called for waivers and exemptions for
health workers, for some preventive and curative services for women  and children (immunizations,  pre-
and postnatal  care), and for patients with tuberculosis,  leprosy, and mental disorders.  In addition, the law
contemplated  partial exemptions for patients suffering from a wide range of communicable diseases.
Since the publication of Law 1313  the target groups and qualifications for exemptions have been
broadened  by policymakers in response to emerging health issues and policy priorities.  Groups added to
the list of the waived are children under five and people over the age of 70, while conditions added to the
exemptions list are snakebite, rabies, and buruli ulcer (Grashong et al., 2001).  The law thus considered a
mix of targeting mechanisms  including targeting by type of service,  group targeting, and individual
targeting (the "pauper").  Individual  assessment  of ability to pay is to be undertaken  by the social welfare
officer at the hospital  who is expected to carry out a means test upon admission.  Facilities are reimbursed
for waivers and exemptions.  The national level transfers funds to the regional level from where they are
allocated to districts, and from there to health facilities.
(d)  Results
The combined effect of a drop in government funding and a real reduction of fees due to inflation led
public health providers to adopt their own user fee policy as in Kenya (see above).  In a sample of four
government district hospitals (Table  8), actual fees were systematically higher than official fees and large
variations in fee levels were observed across facilities.'9
17  Nyonator,  1997.
18  World Bank,  1999.
Adapted  from Coleman,  1997.
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the table" payments became a  government district hospitals, 1997 (cedis)
common practice to cover resource
Maximum shortages.  A study undertaken  in  actual fee
Ghana's Volta Region  found that  Actual fee  over
the median user payment  in  Actual fee  over official  minimum
gos  Price category  Official fee  (mean)  fee  actual fee
government hospitals was 8 times  Outpatient
higher than the officially authorized  department  50  350  7 0  2 5
fees.  Although actual fees seem  Hospitalizations  100  325  3 3  2 5
well above the official  amounts,  Deliveries  100  2,000  20.0  3 0
they are below official fees if these  X-Rays  200  2,000  10 0  1.0
were adjusted by inflation. Multiple  Hemoglobin  I0  475  47.5  1 3
fees were charged  for different  Urine tests  40  575  14.4  1 6
services during a single patient visit,  Stool tests  20  475  23.8  1 3
leading to administrative workload,  Cesarean  1,000  55,000  55 0  20 0
especially for nurses.  In hospitals,  Appendectomy  1,000  55,000  550  220
deposits were asked of patients prior  Hernia  removal  500  28,333  56.7  10 0
to admission.  Data from  15  Source  Adapted from Coleman  (1997)
facilities  located in the Volta Region
showed that user-fee revenue  accounted for about two-thirds of non-salary revenue  in public health
centers and for more than 80 percent of non-salary  revenue  in public hospitals.  According to more recent
information, user fees constitute a substantial  part of revenues for many hospitals  and, by  1999,
represented  about  12 percent of total funding for public hospitals, up from 8 percent two years earlier
(Table 9). 2(1 These  figures illustrate the current high dependence of government  health facilities on user-
fee revenue  to finance non-salary costs.
(e)  Protection mechanisms  Table  9 Ghana:  Revenue  by funding source (in  million
cedis)
Even though no systematic  Distribution
moiosDistribution  1999 monitoring systems  exist, studies  Source of Funding  1997  1998  1999  1997 (percent)  (percent)
indicate that eKemptions were seldom  MOH  139.5  195 0  238 2  43  57
awarded.  According to MOH data  User fees  27.7  330  50.7  8  12
(Nyanator etal.,  1996), only the blind  Health fund  64  12 6  32.9  2  8
or the mentally  handicapped were  Earmarked  6 8  78  13 9  2  3
deemed poor and were therefore  Donor managed  43 5  34 9  43 1  13  10
exempted.  Patient exemptions on the  Donor total  566  552  1049  17  25
grounds of inability to pay were  Credits  101  6  77 0  27  8  31  7
uncommon.  A survey of the Volta  Net total  3254  3602  4216  100  100
Region revealed that 5 out of 24  Source  Adapted from Coleman (1997).
health facilities provided no
exemptions  wlhatsoever.  The total number of waivers and exemptions represented  less than I percent of
the total number of recorded patient contacts, and the most common reason  for exemptions  (71 percent of
the total) was that the patient was a health worker. Patient exit interviews confirmed the low coverage of
protection mechanisms:  of 313 patients selected at random, fewer than 2 percent were fully exempted
from payment. A more recent survey of selected areas in Ghana confirms this finding: "Household heads
were asked whether they or any member had ever been treated free at any government  health facility.  In
the 200 houselholds studied  in AMA (name of the region),  only six (3 percent) had someone treated  free
(i.e., waived or exempted).  In the rural sample, only three (less than 2 percent)  had ever received free
20  Reference  provided by F Decaillet, World Bank
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  40treatment.  In the former case, 24 households  have someone who had been treated free but for whom
someone had paid (their own or their spouse's employer or)"(Saprin,  2001).
Recent reviews by Garshong (2001)  and Coleman (1997)  show that health facilities are generally
reluctant to waiver or exempt patients and charge fees for services that are officially  and universally free
of charge (Table 10 and Table  121).  This once more illustrates the widespread disregard that exists
among public facility managers for national policies on fees and exemptions.
Table 10 Ghana:  Percentage  of patients paying full user fee  by patient category  and  by region
Patient category
Pregnant  Child  Curative  care  Care for those
women  Welfare  children under five  aged 70 and  Other specific
Paupers  (percent)  Clinic  (percent)  over  Tuberculosis  diseases
Region  (N=20)  (N=149)  (N=35)  (N=129)  (N=103)  (N=39)  (N=28)
Ashanti  - 100  100  100  60  67  100
Brong  - 50  38  100  63  0  40
Central  - 50  100  75  13  33  -
Eastern  0  82  100  50  73  0  100
Greater  25  93  100  94  63  43  100 Accra
Northern  33  18  0  24  8  - 43
Upper  50  24  0  56  44  0  0
East
Upper  50  42  0  31  9  33  20 West
Volta  0  56  - 100  31  0 / 6  50
Western  100  40  60  100  50  33  -
Total  40  56  51  71  41  28  36
Source:  Garshong et a/.,  2001
Seven factors  seem to explain  low coverage of protection  Table 11  Ghana:  Proportion of
mechanisms  in Ghana. First, exemption  categories were not  facilities charging for exempted
well defined by health authorities or well understood by  services
health personnel  and various local  interpretations of the law  Disease officially exempted  District Hospitals
existed.  Below is a list of common definitions of the term  Measles  10/11
"pauper" according to a recent survey by Garshong (2001):  Typhoid  11/11
Hepatitis  11/11
*  Someone  who has no relatives  Tetanus  11/11
*  Someone  who  has  no  means  of  looking  after  Sickle cell  11/11
him/herself  Source. Garshong et al,  2001
*  A disabled person with no money and no family
*  Someone who cannot pay, who  is poorly dressed, and who has a chronic illness
*  Someone  who  has  no traceable  relatives  and  is  financially  not  capable  of paying  for  services
received
*  Someone who  is classified by the priest or by management  as unable to pay the required amount
Second,  many potential beneficiaries  were  unaware or misinformed  about waivers and exemptions and
even facility staff did not have a full understanding  of the policy.  The following statement collected by
21  Coleman,  1997.
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  41Nyanator and his colleagues during focus group discussions gives a sense of the high degree of public's
misinformation.
"To be fair and frank,  I am  not aware of any such facility [that grants waivers  and  exemptions for the
poor];  however,  I  am  aware  that  hospital  bills  of  government  workers  and  their  dependents  are
refundable by the government."  (Nyanator,  1997)
In a more recent  study by Saprin (2001) based on a sample of 33 patients who visited a public facility for
treatment,  he asked whether some patients knew they were not expected to pay.  Virtually all of them (94
percent) were unaware of their potential  right to exemptions. Also, Garshong'  eta!. 's 2001  study alluded
to above shows that whereas facility staff seem to know patient waiver categories (for example the blind,
the handicapped), they do not fully understand  what type of services  are to be exempted (for example
immunizations).  Focus group discussions with pregnant women held within a facility reveal major
variation  in the interpretation  of this policy.
Third, most facilities have not made any institutional arrangements  to identify poor patients. A reason
given by health  staff for this was the lack of social welfare workers or of specialized staff for carrying out
individual assessment.
Fourth, there vvas no supervision  or monitoring of the process of exemptions and waivers and there were
no sanctions or penalties to those who did not follow the guidelines.
Fifth, there are  financial and administrative difficulties  in the reimbursement process for those facilities
granting waivers and exemptions.  In  1999, the Govemment of Ghana was able to provide only about 22
percent of the amount need to reimburse public providers for free care (Coleman, 2000).  Also, there are
serious delays  in the flow of free-care compensation  funds at all levels of the system.  As can be seen
from Table  12, facilities may have to wait between  I month and  I year (on average 4 months) to get
reimbursed for free care.  Districts also had to wait up to year.  Staff interviewed  noted the following:
'The  government  asked us to give exemptions  and they [told us] they will refund  later. We found  that
the  money was not coming,  so we stopped.  [...]  It affects our purchasing  power:  consumables and
drugs get out of stock." (Garshong,  2001)
In addition, facility staff complained about increased workload and stationery costs related to exemption
and waiver procedures.  As one health provider put it:
'There  is  extra  work  of recording  exemptions  in  the  lab.  It is  extra  work  so  someone  should  be
employed to be doing it. We sometimes  have to stay longer to work on the recording  at the lab, no one
pays us ior it and I haven't told anyone to pay for that."  (Garshong et al,  2001)
Sixth, this situation, together with the increasing  Table  12 Ghana:  Average  duration of fund
reliance of facilities on user fees for their financing  transfer at various levels, Jan-Dec.  1999
seems to have created strong incentives to emphasize  (months)
revenue  collection rather than the protection  of the  Region  Districts  Institutions
poor.  Ashanti  5  4  3
Greater Accra  12  12,75  4,5
Seventh and finally, there seem to be problems of  Eastern  10  4  4
leakage.  For instance, since the late  1980s facilities  Western  6  7  6
have been exempting not only health facility staff but  Brong  1  3  4
other, non-target people have been getting waivers or  Volta  NA  4  5
reimbursements  for their health care payments,  Central  NA  NA  2,4
including civil servants, employees of para-statal  Upper East  3  2  3
firms, members of public boards, and the staff of large  Upper West  NA  NA  3,1
corporations (Saprin, 2001).  Northern  1  2  4
Source: Garshong et at., 2001
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Coverage of the mechanism to protect the poor under cost recovery remains  low in Ghana. The following
are the main factors  explaining this situation, many of which are relevant to policy makers wishing to
implement or strengthen mechanisms to protect the poor under user fees:
*  Insufficient funding for the reimbursement of providers granting waivers and exemptions.
*  Inconsistency  of objectives  at the  facility  level  arising  from  a tradeoff between  the objective  of
protecting  the poor through  exemptions  and waivers and  generating  user fee  revenue to pay for
local  costs of health services.
*  Excessive bureaucracy and untimely reimbursement of providers.
*  Inadequate  explanation  of the poor-protection  policy by the central  to  local  level  implementers
and  lack of staff training on waiver and exemption procedures.
*  Negative  attitude of staff towards  policies  for protecting the poor  as waivers mean  less  income
and more work.
*  Lack  of  knowledge  about  exemptions  and  waivers  among  potential  beneficiaries  in  the
population.
*  Erosion  of  user  fees  by  inflation  and  associated  spontaneous  and  unregulated  attempts  by
providers to update fees.
*  High and uncompensated administrative  costs for facility staff engaged  in leading.
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(a)  Background
Although Zimbabwe  is not the poorest of the countries  in the case study sample,  it is the one with the
lowest life expectancy at birth (LEB).  Zimbabwe's population of 11.4 million has a LEB of only 40.41
years.  In  1997 per capita income  was $2.680 (PPP-adjusted)  and per capita health expenditure  was
$49.00, representing 6.6 percent of GDP.  According to the World Development Report (2000), about
one-fourth of the population lives below the national poverty line.  One person out of three living in rural
areas stands  below the poverty line and one-third of all children exhibit second and third degree
malnutrition.  Moreover,  currently Zimbabwe is among the world's hardest hit countries with the AIDS
epidemic,  leading to a surge in demand for AIDS- related treatment.
Real government spending for health increased rapidly in the economic boom years following
independence,  and then grew only 4 percent annually from  1982 to 1988.  In 1990/91,  health spending
peaked at 6 8 percent of the national budget. On a per capita basis, real health spending reached Z$49
(about US$20)  in  1991, among the highest in Africa (Error! Reference  source not found.).  In 1991,  the
government launched  its economic structural adjustment program just before the worst drought of the
century struck.  The combination of
drought and inadequate  implementation  F
of the adjustment program contributed to  igure 11  Zimbabwe:  Trends  in government  health
a 30 percent decline in per capita health
spending from  1990/91  to  1992/93.23  $50  . '  '  /--  8 00
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urban areas (World Bank,  1998a).  At the  ___  ___  _  _____
primary level they increased from Z$ I
per visit to Z$6.5. Previously free prenatal care was set at $Z 10.  District hospital fees rose to Z$ 17 and,
to streamline the referral system, a bypass fee of Z$24 was established  for all those patients demanding
care directly in district hospitals, and Z$38 for those doing so in provincial hospitals (Watkins,  1997).
However, since accumulated  inflation was more than 800 percent in the same time span, real fees were
lower in  1994 than they had been in the eighties.  Bank policy advice influenced the government's
decision to strengthen  enforcement and increase levels of fees for government health facilities  (see Box
8).  The actual  design of the fee structure, however, was in many respects contrary to what the World
22  The Zimbabwe  case covers facts taking place in the 1990s, as the authors were  unable to obtain current information  on
the subject
23  This section is taken from World Bank, 1  998a
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  44Bank had suggested. For example, the Bank had recommended  providing certain preventive  services for
free or at highly subsidized rates, an advice that was not followed by policymakers. Also, the government
did not implement other recommendations  made by the Bank to increase revenue.  A World Bank report
(World Bank,  1  998a) gives the following explanation:  "although user fees were not a major potential
source of revenue,  they were within the direct control of the MOH  and could be increased by
administrative  decree. The other recommendations  (see Box 8) were longer-term  endeavors, requiring
new legislation, institutional  change, and the cooperation  of other ministries  and stakeholders".
In  1995 the government ordered the abolishment of user fees in rural health centers following an MOH
study (MOH,  1995 quoted in  World Bank,  1998a) concluding that the high levels of fees and widespread
confusion about fees and referral policies reduced attendance without improving referral efficiency.
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  45Box 8 Health Financing  Sector Review  Recommendations
The 1990 health financing study was the Bank's  Table  13  Zimbabwe:  Expected  increase in MOH
most comprehensive  and influential analysis of health  resources,  1990 (Z$ millions)
funding and expenditure in Zimbabwe. The study was
organized around three major topics: resource  Annual
mobilization for health; increasing the allocative and  Revenue item  Revenue
technical efficiency of health care; and developing  User charges  42-52
systems and skills to support stronger health  Full-cost pricing for private patients  (15-20)
financing.  Out-patient fees  (10)
To improve  resource mobilization for health, the  Drug charges  (10-15)
health financing study recommended  increasing user  Adjusting fees for inflation  (7)
fees in public: facilities (to restore them to real 1985  National Health  Development  Fund  80
levels); establishing a national health development  Cost-sharing with local government  10-15
fund (financed  through alcohol or tobacco taxes);  and mission facilities
increased 'cost-sharing"  by local govemment and  Expanded private insurance  80-100
church mission  health providers;  and expansion of the  TOTAL  212-247
private health insurance system. The Bank suggested  Source  World  Bank,  1998a
that the recommended  measures could generate up to  The Bank's recommendations,  however, were
Z$250 million additional resources annually for the  centered on cost recovery.  The study appropriately
health sector  (Table  12).  emphasized that improved  billing at central hospitals
Of this total, lhe study estimated that Z$130 million  and reduced  public subsidies to private care were
could be available to the  MOH (equal to more than  priority actions relative to the increase in cost recovery
half of the MOH's 1987-88 budget).  Based on these  at primary and secondary health facilities. Fees
recommendations,  the ESAP and the second  Family  should  be  set to encourage clients to seek care at the
Health Project set a goal of recovering  10 percent of  lowest level of the system.  At lower levels, the main
the MOH  budget by 1995.  goal of cost recovery was to enhance the efficiency of
the referral system and deter unnecessary use.  The
The improve efficiency, the Bank also  study called for charging separately for inpatient and
recommended  al reallocation  of health expenditure to  outpatient drugs to recover costs and deter
give greater emiphasis to  primary health care,  unnecessary use. The Bank also recommended
improved management practices, and contracting out  shifting the burden of proof of income to the client and
of services with the private sector.  increasing the income threshold for free care.
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  46The Ministry of Finance did not allow facilities to retain revenue  from user fees until  late  1997.  Prior to
then, when user fees were  retained by the central treasury, there was little incentive for facilities to collect
fees.  By 1995 revenue collected  from user fees represented  about 5 percent of total revenue in
government  health facilities.
(c)  Protection mechanisms
In  1991  the government introduced  the Social  Table 14 Zimbabwe:  Eligibility criteria
Development  Fund (SDF) with two components,  of which  for waivers  in real and nominal terms
one sought to grant assistance to poor households to cover  Year  Nominal temms  Real terms (1980=100)
school and health care fees. Waivers were to apply to  1981  150  131
those with monthly family income below  Z$150.  This  1982  150  111
threshold was maintained  until  1991  when it was  1983  150  95
increased to Z$400 per family. As can be seen  from Table  1984  150  84
14 steady inflation during this period eroded the income  1985  150  77
criteria. Potential beneficiaries'  real income had to drop  1986  150  67
progressively to remain eligible for waivers.24 Even when  1987  150  61
the income criterion was adjusted by inflation  it was still  1988  150  57
below the threshold  initially established in  1981.  Also, the  1989  150  51
income cutoff point was permanently below the urban  1990  150  45
poverty line (Table  15). In addition, the income  criterion  1991  400  110
did not take into account family size.  Source
To establish eligibility, potential beneficiaries had to go to social welfare offices with extensive and often
hard-to-get documentation.  In urban areas eligibility documents  included pay slips, income-tax returns
and  letters from social welfare offices.  This information was the basis for income determination.  In rural
areas this information had to be supplemented by information  on household size, landholding, and type of
dwelling. Unfortunately the criteria adopted  proved rigid and hard to apply because only 20 percent of the
population works in the formal sector and most applicants have in-kind or erratic incomes (Loewenson
,2000; World Bank,  1998a).  There was some additional  screening process as eligibility had to be
confirmed by head teachers and village elders  and potential  beneficiaries  had to pay administrative fees
for this.  High transport costs were involved and often several trips were necessary to complete this
process. Eligible beneficiaries  were given "free care letters" which they were  to present at facilities to
receive  free care.25
Facilities were to be compensated for  Table 15 Zimbabwe: Comparison of poverty lines and
exemptions through the SDF in  eligibility  criteria
Harare. However,  reimbursement to  Poverty line (month, per
health units would take up to 8  Income cut off point  household)*
months since they required  Year  for waiver eligibility  Urban  Rural
authorization from Harare.  Funding  1990  150  302  193
was inadequate as SDF made smaller  1992  450  529  338
allowances than  actually required.  Source- *  Poverty line established in  World Bank  1995 poverty assessment  report  Level
Finally, potential beneficiaries  were  is  based on resources  required to cover expenses from  the consumption of a
misinformed or uninformed about the  minimum package  of goods (for further details see World Bank,  1995).
waiver system.
Data on  inflation was taken from information  of the Central Statistical Office of Zimbabwe.
25  Data on poverty  line for 1990 is taken from World Bank,  1995.  Poverty data for 1992  are expressed  in  real  1990
Zimbabwe  dollars
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  47(d)  Results
There is substantial  evidence suggesting that user fees have negatively affected the poor.26 For example,
according to the  1994 Zimbabwe  Demographic and Health Survey, 42 percent of the urban poor who
reported an  illness in the previous month gave "cannot afford" as the reason for not seeking treatment,
compared  to  14 percent for rural poor. 27  Also, attendance for antenatal care initially declined in some
districts and urban hospitals serving poor populations following fee increases  in  1994, but it subsequently
recovered  in most districts.  The major negative consequences  of the fee increases  seem to be:  (i) low-
income womeni are waiting to begin antenatal care, either to save money or to ensure the pregnancy will
reach full term; and (ii) the financial  burden on poor households. This indicates that the analysis of the
impact of user fees on the poor should not only consider  its consequence  on the quantity of services
consumed but that  is should also analyze its financial impact on households  as well as the changes it
might introduce in the health care seeking behavior (type of services consumed, timing of visits). The
same survey  indicates that the percentage of births in health facilities has not changed since  198[?].  The
1994 DHS found that 91  percent of urban women and 61 percent of rural women delivered at a health
facility, virtually the same as found in the 1988  DHS (CSO  1988,  1995). Yet a study by Lennock (1994)
shows that following stricter enforcement of charges, maternity admissions  at Harare  Central  Hospital
Maternity unit showed  a 21  percent increase  in the number of babies 'born before arrival' and later
required admission due to problems; among these babies mortality rose  156 percent.  According to
Lennock cost was one of the major reasons for giving birth at home and for requesting early discharge
after delivery. Many people do not seek care because they are unaware that they are exempt from fees.
Moreover, prescription costs  lead to discontinuation of treatment.  District outpatient attendance has
declined following increased  fee enforcement,  with the greatest declines  among children. For children
under 5 it fell by 30 percent from  1990 to 1992, which coincided with increased fees in  1991  and
decreased incomes from the  1992 drought. Attendance rose sharply following the removing of rural fees
in  1995, but average  under-5 outpatient attendance rates are still below 1990 levels. In contrast, adult
attendance fell only 20 percent over those two years and by 1996 was 20 percent above  1990 levels. In
hospitals serving low-income  populations, inpatient attendance  dropped following fee increases, then
recovered.
A study by Hongoro and the MOH (Hongoro,  1994) shows that in rural facilities health care demand
increased  after fees were  abolished in  1995.  Loewenson (2000) found that 6 months into the elimination
of fees,  demand  fell again as the inventories of drugs and medical supplies dwindled leading patients to
bypass primary care facilities and seek care directly from the fee-charging  district-level  hospitals.  There
is evidence of people's willingness to pay fees when they felt that payment would give them access to
quality services. Communities  in Zimbabwe have  in fact mobilized resources in many different ways such
as in kind contribution of labor and food donation.  In the case of rural Zimbabwe, exempting the rural
poor from payments  was an ineffective way of protecting the poor, as the exemption resulted  in a drop in
quality of care.  Loewenson (2000) noted:
'People  no longer accepted political messages  of 'free health services'  when services were collapsing
[and] weie willing to make fair contributions."
Total cost recovery from fees was low but increased substantially when facilities were allowed to retain
fees.  Since then, it has stagnated at below 5 percent of the recurrent health budget (Loewenson, 2000).
Increased fees were criticized  for not being associated with better quality services, especially when
patients where charged irrespective  of whether drugs or other supplies were provided to them.  In the
urban area28 where protection mechanisms were supposedly  in place to protect the poor against user fees,
26  A sumrmary  of this evidence can be found in  World Bank,  1  998a
27,  Reference is made to the urban  poor as fees had been abolished  in rural facilities at this time.
28  User fees were abolished in  rural areas in the mid 1990s.
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection mechanisms  48about 40 percent of the urban poor stated that the reason for not seeking health care at government
facilities was the high price of services (Loewenson,  2000).
Also, many poor people did not apply to program waivers because either they had not heard of the SDF
or they did not know how to apply for waivers.  By late  1993  only around one-half of the population had
heard about the possibility of getting waivers through the SDF (Watkins,  1997).  Many eligible persons
seemed unwilling to apply because of the stigma associated  with welfare benefits. Overall,  only 20
percent of the urban poor and  10 percent of the rural poor received  assistance with health fees (World
Bank,  1  998a).  There  is anecdotal  evidence suggesting that some waivers were granted on the basis of
political  preference (e.g., depending on who was the political candidate favored by the applicant in the
latest election).  Finally, health facilities were often reluctant to grant waivers as reimbursement
mechanisms for waivers and exemptions did not work adequately.
(e)  Lessons  learned
The following are main lessons emerging from Zimbabwe's experience  with protection of the poor under
user fees:
*  The setting up of a fund to compensate facilities  for exemptions and  waivers does  not suffice  to
confer incentives  to the providers for exempting the poor. Among the most important reasons are:
lack of funding; delay in reimbursements of revenue  loss due to waivers and exemptions and high
costs associated with labor-intensive  bureaucratic  procedures.
*  High participation  costs discourage the poor from applying for a waiver.
*  Limited  information about the program and its  benefits arnong  prospective beneficiaries hampers
the effectiveness of the exemption system.
*  The abolishment of user fees may not boost demand among the poor when it is accompanied  by a
drop in quality.
*  The income  criterion  is difficult to  apply in  a country where  most work  in the  informal  sector,
have irregular  income, and there are no infornation systems that might help to establish  applicant
eligibility.
*  The income criteria have to be adjusted to changing economic conditions.
3.6  Indonesia:  The Kartu Sehat Program 29
(a)  Background
With a population of 206 million in 2001,  Indonesia is the world's fifth most populated  nation, after
China, Russia, the United States and India.  The country enjoyed remarkable  economic growth in the
1980s and much of the  1990s. As a result, Indonesia's middle class grew considerably,  but poverty
remained widespread.  Indonesia plunged  into an economic crisis  in  1997 that led to significant political
changes and increased the vulnerability of the poor.
29  Unless otherwAse noted, the information for this case comes  from Gibbons 1995, Saadah et al, 2001,  Sumarto et al.,
2001, Ausaid v2000,  Saddah, 2001, and SMERU,  2000
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection mechanisms  49About one quarter of Indonesia's  population lives  below the national poverty line.  In an effort to expand
coverage of health services for the poor, since the early 1970s the government has promoted the
expansion of public health centers and sub-centers.  In the late  1  970s, the probability of seeking modern
treatment  by the poor when ill was less than 40 percent; by  1987  it had increased to 52 percent.  These
gains, however, have been reverted by Indonesia's sharp drop in income during the current economic
crisis.
(b)  User-fiee  policy
A major expansion and strengthening of the government's primary health system in the  1980s strained the
public budget for health and led to the government's  decision in the early 1990s to increase reliance on
user fee revenue for health  financing.  Facilities  can only retain part of the revenue  collected from user
fees. In some places, health centers can keep 25 percent of the revenue collected; the balance is
distributed  with the budget allocation from the province  (Newbrander, 2001).  Fees seem to be quite low,
they vary according to the level of care and across the country, and they are generally higher at higher
levels of care.  A RAND  study analyzing the impact of user fees on access concluded that the higher
prices  led to decreased  utilization of modern health care facilities,  especially by low-income families.  It
also found that many of the poor would exit the formal medical  care market in response to higher fees.
Although to date fees remain low compared to cost, they are unaffordable  to many of the poor,
particularly  for inpatient care.  Private expenditure represents  almost 65 percent of total health
expenditure  and out-of-pocket payments by patients finance nearly one-half of all spending in the public
sector.
(c)  Protection policy
Indonesia combines different  mechanisms to protect the poor under user fees. Surat Miskin or "poor
letters"  are given to persons who cannot afford to pay the full cost of services. To obtain this waiver, the
poor have to go to the village head and sub-district officials  for signed approvals.  Government health
facilities  grant: total or partial waivers to patients holding a Surat  Miskin. Very few people seem to be
using Surat Miskin, however, owing to the complicated  administrative requirements and high travel  costs
associated  with them.  Also, government  officials often charge additional fees in exchange for their
signature of the necessary documents.  Free care is traditionally given to people who work as volunteers
in the village posts that deliver child health  and prenatal  care services.
Since  1994, in an effort to mitigate the adverse effect of user fees on the poor, Indonesia adopted the
Kartu Sehat Program,  an initiative that continues to function today and that has received additional
impetus during the recent economic crisis of South East Asia.30 The program is intended to cover all poor
families in the: country. It distributes cards which entitle the recipients to obtain  free services in all
government health facilities.  A single card is handed out to each recipient family, and up to eight family
members can be listed  on the card. Cardholders needing health care must first go to a government  health
center.  For further, higher-level  care, the health facility must issue a referral letter entitling the patient to
guaranteed  free access in public hospitals.  Until recently public facilities had to absorb the revenue
foregone  fronri this free-care policy.  Since  1998, however,  service providers are compensated for the
additional woirkload through a governmental budget transfer that is established on the basis of the number
of card holders living in the district (Cameron, 2000).
Kartu Sehot cards follow a long bureaucratic journey until they reach the individual  recipients.  They
originate  al the provincial  level of government  and move down the decentralization  path.3'  Each
30  Kartu Sehat means  'exemption  card" in Indonesian
31  There are 32  provinces and 357 districts (regencies).
3.  Empincal  evidence on protection mechanisms  50provincial MOH distributes cards to the head of the district government, which in turns forwards the cards
to the head of its poor sub-districts.  Within each sub-district, priority is given to those villages identified
as being the poorest (also known as IDT villages or "left behind"  villages), based on information  from the
Central  Bureau of Statistics.  From there, cards are allocated to the heads of low-income villages, and then
to the head of the sub-villages where cards are finally handed out to the poorest households  (village heads
or health center staff selects recipient households from a list containing all poor households in the poor
villages). Originally, different villages used different types of information to select the poor.  Some use
the so-called  "Dinas  Social list" of all poor households  in the IDT villages; others select households
according to their socioeconomic  status (Gibbons,  1995).  The process of selecting the poorest is made by
the village or neighborhood head (World Bank, 2000).
Kartu  Sehat has received  a major impetus with the Social Safety Net Program that was introduced  by the
government  in the late 1990s to combat the impact of the economic  crisis.  Still it was recognized that the
scheme was not functioning as envisaged.  At most, card holders obtained free services at Puskesmas
(health centers),  but rarely did the services extend to hospitals or to delivery services for pregnant women.
With the adoption of mechanism to compensate providers  for waivers given  in the late  1  980s access to
health services by the poor improved.  Further, Kartu Sehat now puts greater pressure on providers to
play an active role in administering the scheme,  including the process of identification of poor families.
Providers participating  in the program are also expected to recording details about beneficiaries and to
issue the program cards (Ausaid,  2000).  Also, eligibility criteria have been modified.  The poverty
measure currently in use to determine eligibility is the so called household  "prosperity status".  Under
this new policy a household  is deemed eligible for the health card if it fails to meet any of the following
criteria (Sumarto  S, Suryahadi,  A, 2001):
*  All household members are able to practice their religious  principles.
*  Al household members are able to eat basic food twice a day.
*  All household members have different sets of clothing for home,  work, school and home.
*  The largest floor area of the house is not made of dirt.
*  The household  is able to seek modem  medical  assistance  for sick  children and  family  planning
services.
The National  Family Planning Board collects information on this issue. The task of selecting beneficiaries
is now handled by local teams that must operate within program guidelines but which still have
substantial discretion  in defining eligibility
(d)  Results
The Kartu Sehat program  is rapidly  increasing its coverage.  Data from a nationwide household  survey
(Susena,  1999)  indicates that  10.6 percent of Indonesian households  report ownership of a health card
(Saadah  and Pradhan, 2001).32  Data from the Central Independent Monitoring Unit (CIMU) is even more
promising as it found that by July 2000,  in 5 provinces being closely monitored,  89 percent of all poor
families were Kartu  Sehat beneficiaries; only about 10 percent of all covered were non-poor (leakage);
and over 70 percent of  pregnant women  in poor households had received  ante-natal care and assistance
during delivery (World Bank, 2000).  However, there  is information that indicates much higher levels of
leakage than indicated by CIMU. According to the 1999 National  Household Survey,  about 39 percent of
the health cards were owned by household from the wealthiest three quintiles (Saadah  and Pradhan,
2001).
32 Each  card covers an entire household
3.  Empirical evidence on  protection mechanisms  51The presumption about high leakage has been  confirmed in a study by Sumarto et al. (2001). These
authors found that the proportion of those belonging to the poorest quintile using health cards to obtain
program benefits was 10.6 percent while the equivalent  proportion  among the non-poor was 5.3 percent
(Table  17).  Leakage may partly be explained by the fact that the income criteria used by Kartu Sehat may
not adequately capture poverty.  Sumarto (2001) used household survey data to simulate the target
population with the current  income criteria and compared  it with the population that would be eligible if
the national consumption based poverty line would be used instead. They also found that 38 percent of
those who are according to the national  poverty line are not eligible for Kartu  Sehat according to the
official eligibility criteria.  On the other hand, 46 percent of the non-poor households were eligible and 38
percent of ihe poor were not eligible (Sumarto, 2001)
Several  studies question the effectiveness  Table  16 Indonesia: Relationship  between  Kartu
of Kartu Sehat as many health card  Sehat eligibility criteria and  income-based  poverty
owners do not seem to use them when  criterion, 2000
seeking care  from a public provider  Consumption-based  measure of poverty
(Saadah,  Pradhan , 2001  and Cameron,  Poor  Non-poor  Total
2000).  Soelaksono et al. (1999,  quoted in  Kartu  Eligible  15%  (62%)  85% (46%)  100%
Saadah and Pradhan,  2001) mention  Sehatl  Non-  25% (38%)  75% (64%)  100% eligibility  eligible
among the reasons  for this behavior a  criteria  Total  (100%)  (100%)
lower quality of service for health card
users (for example  less time allocated  to  Source  Sumarto,  2001
patients).  According to the same authors, health card holders confirm this situation: they perceive the
care received  through the health card to be of lower quality than services obtained when not using the
card.  This situation may be explained by the fact that providers are paid on a lump sum basis rather than
on a case-based or other volume-related  form of provider payment.
Table  117 Indonesia: Coverage  of social safety  net programs  across expenditure  quintiles
Program  Coverage ([percent?]  Ratio
Poor  Non-Poor  Non-
Eligible  Total  poor to
Program  Recipients  Q0  Q 2 Q3  Q4  Q5  Total  Q. - Qs  Poor
Subsidized Rice  50,385,444  52  64  46.24  41  71  35 76  24 33  36 90  40.09  0 70
Employment Creation  50,385,444  8  31  6 89  5 79  4 58  2 53  4 94  5.61  0 59
Primary School Scholarships  29,745,369  5  80  4 84  4 02  3 52  2 04  3 60  4.03  0 62
Lower Secondary  School
Scholarships  10,394,621  12 15  10 31  8 34  6 73  4 85  4 53  8  42  0 62
Upper Secondary  School
Scholarships  6,430,146  5 40  5 06  3 32  3 04  1 96  3.32  3.71  0 62
Medical Services  27,567,138  10.60  7.24  6.3  4.52  3.09  5.28  6.33  0.50
Nutrition  19,970,948  16 54  16.64  16 38  15 94  14 24  15.94  15 94  0 95
Source  Sumarto  2000.
Kartu Sehat has experienced  several  implementation problems that might be of interest to other countries
wishing to imlplement similar poor-protection  mechanisms.  One of the problems has been widespread
lack of knowledge about the program by both health facility personnel and patients. A newsletter
evaluating the program states:
"Too many people remain  confused or simply do not know how the Health Card  scheme is intended  to
work  Who is entitled to receive a card?  What benefits does it provide?  Which  members  are covered
and for how long?"  (SMERU,  2000)
3.  Empircal evidence on protection mechanisms  52Also,  in the first years of implementation  knowledge about the program among public officials varied
widely from region to region.33 For example,  in a  1995 field study from district health officers  in the
province of Daerah Istimewah  Yogyakarta (DIY) received clear implementation  instructions  and criteria
for the selection of poor households from  local lists.  In contrast, in the province of  Nusa Tenggara Barat
(NTB) the implementation procedures  were unclear and program staff was unable to implement Kartu
Sehat (Gibbons,  1995).  According to the same study, health service providers also had limited
knowledge about Kartu Sehat.  Most health staff participating  in a survey about the program were not
aware that beneficiaries  referred to hospitals were also entitled to free care in those facilities.
(e)  Lessons learned
The following  are identified as the most critical  findings in Program implementation  of Kartu Sehat:
*  Lack of information  by consumers,  providers,  and  government  officials  and  insufficient training
have been two major problems encountered  in the implementation of Kartu  Sehat.
*  Cumbersome  distribution of Kartu Sehat cards from  higher to lower levels of government not only
means high administrative costs but also leads to delay and retention of cards. This  issue illustrates
that  national  program  implementation  can  be  very  challenging  in  very  large  and  decentralized
countries.
*  Eligibility  criteria  fail  to  adequately  capture  the  poor  as  many  non-poor  (as  measured  by  the
national poverty line) are eligible and many poor are not eligible for Kartu Sehat.
*  The Indonesia  case  illustrates the  importance  of reimbursing  facilities  for  revenue  foregone  from
waivers.  Program coverage  has  increased  substantially  when  facilities  started to get compensated
for waivers  given under Kartu Sehat.
*  Coverage  is  an  insufficient  measure  of protection  of the  poor.  In  Indonesia  many poor  do have a
health card but they do not use it as perceived quality of services  is sometimes  low.
3.7  Thailand's Low Income  Card Scheme  (LICS)34
(a)  Context
Thailand went through a period of remarkable economic growth  in the 1980s and  1990s that made it one
of the fastest growing economies of South East Asia and the world, with an average annual GDP growth
of 9.1  percent from  1986 to  1996.  Thailand's population  of 62.4 million has a life expectancy at birth
(LEB) of 68.6 years -three more years than Indonesia and about  1.5 years less than China.  As most
regional economies, Thailand  started to experience a severe economic crisis  in the late nineties. Poverty
has increased as a consequence although  not to the extent seen in other countries in the region, such as
Indonesia and Korea
The economic crisis also drastically changed the health financing scenario.  The per capita government
budget for the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) declined  by 25 percent in real terms between 1997 and
1999.  The MOPH responded by cutting capital expenditure,  rationalizing the use and procurement  of
drugs, and reducing expenditure  for utilities and travel.  Benefits under the Civil Servants Medical
No  up to date information was available on this issue when this report was being written
34  Based  mainly  on Gilson etal., 1998, Donaldson,  1999 and Somchai 1998
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection mechanisms  53Benefits  Scheme were restricted to care from public sector facilities.  In addition, between  1996 and  1998
household annual  health expenditures on health facility-based  care declined sharply -by 36 percent in real
terms (to 2,3 1  6 baht).35 At the same time, household  spending on self-medication  increased  by 12  percent
(to 552 baht).  This change  in patient behavior reversed  a long-term trend away from self-treatment
towards treatment by trained health providers (NESDB, 2000).
A wide range of insurance or benefit schemes  are available to the Thai population. The five major
systems are: the Civil Servants Medical  Benefits Scheme (CSMBS), a Social Security Scheme (SSS), the
Voluntary HeaLlth Card  Scheme (VHCS), the Low Income Card Scheme (LICS) and commercial private
health  insurance  (Table  18). Together, they provide protection to about 76 percent of the population.  The
poor and near poor are protected  by LICS (see details below) and VHCS (Table  19). VHCS covers near-
poor households as well, mostly in rural areas. Beneficiaries can voluntarily buy a card which attracts  a
matching tax subsidy and which gives them access to free care at public facilities.
Table  18 Thailand: Characteristics of health insurance schemes,  circa 2000
Insurance  Nature of  Coverage  Coverage  Population  Financing
Program  Scheme  (millions)  (percent)  Characteristics  Source of Funds  Body
CSMBS  ErBenefit  6,6  11  Civil Servants  MOPH  Fund  MOF
Employees in Firms  Tripartite contributions  Social
SSS  Compulsory  4,8  8  Larger than  10  (MOPH, employer,  Sci
Persons  employee,  1,50% of  Scrt
Persons  ~wagesg  Organization
VHCS  Voluntary  6,0  10  Near Poor  MOPH Fund  Mlnistry of
Indigent,  Children  <
Social  12, Elderly, Veterans,  Ministry of LICS  Welfare  27  45  Handicapped,  MOPH  Fund  Health
Religious &
Community Leaders
Private  \Voluntary  1,2  2  Richest segment of  Premium  Households
the population
Total  50,4  76
Source  Donalclson  et a,  1999
Table 19 Thailand: Coverage of LICS and VHCS
Services
Insurance  Provider  Prevention  not
Program  Ambulatory  Inpatient  Choice  Matemity  Promotion  Covered
VHCS  Public  Public  Requires  Yes  Possible  Pvt  Bed Referral
Requires  ~~~~~~Special
LICS  Public  Public  Referral  Yes  Limited  RN  P
Referral  ~~~~Bed
Source: Donaldson et al,  1999
(b)  User Fee  Policy 37
Thailand  has a  long standing user fee policy in the public sector implemented with clear policy guidelines
since  1976-77;  it raises a significant amount of revenue.  A rough estimate indicates that, on average,
about 60 percent of Ministry of Public Health (MPH) hospital's total revenue comes from the
35  [Provide! exchange rate ]
Due to the economic crisis, this percentage was reduced to 1.0%  after 1998 (see  Donaldson et al  1999)
Taken from: Health Care  Reform Project Thailand on:  http l/www moph go th/ops/hcrp/mainhcrp  php7select=Finance  html
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  54government's allocation  and 40 percent from user charges. Of this user fee revenue, approximately  one-
third is collected from patients on a fee-for-service  basis (mostly from the sales of drugs),  and the
remainder comes from reimbursements from insurance plans.  Often a major portion of hospital payments
comes from the civil servant benefit schemes which cover many of the hospitalized  patients and which
pay hospitals their full fee. In health centers, user fees may account for as much as 70 percent of  total
revenue.  Health centers provide an  average of 3,644 visits per year, half of which for patients covered by
the free care program.  User fees are collected mainly from the sale of drugs.  Hospitals and health centers
set their charges on a sliding scale, and have the discretion  to decide  how much to charge patients based
on the provider's assessment of their ability to pay.  Patients covered under insurance plans, such as civil
servants and their dependents, are often charged a higher price -two to three times the lowest price.
(c)  Protection mechanism
To protect the poor against the financial burden of user fees, the government developed the Low Income
Card Scheme  (LICS) under which the poor have free access to public facilities.  Thailand has over twenty
years of experience with LICS as operations  started  in 1975.
At the beginning of LICS, the directors of  Table  20 Thailand: National  poverty line and cut off
public hospitals had the authority to screen  points for LICS
the beneficiaries and grant exemptions to  1988-89  1993-94  1997-98
the poor on their own criteria.  Different  National per capita  poverty  Imen
cash incomes  cutoff points have been used  per monthl  473  636  911
to determine applicant eligibility.  Since  Cut off point for a  single/month  1500  2000  2000
1993, eligible  beneficiaries are single  Source:  Donaldson,  1999,  and based  on Somcha,
persons with a monthly income of less than 2,000 baht ($47) and households  with a combined monthly
income of less than 2,800 baht ($66). 38  Cutoff points were neither differentiated  for urban and rural
settings nor updated on a regular basis.  Table  20 compares cutoff points of eligibility for LICS with
national  poverty lines for several years. As the income level for being entitled to the LICS systematically
exceeds the poverty line, the program
potentially covers not only the poor but
also the near poor.  Figure 11 Thailand: Official procedures for
screening  the poor,  1981
During the  1990s LICS eligibility was
expanded to include not only the income  DOstnct offirer  application forms,  which
poor but also other groups, including the  '  show all household  eamings elderbutals  children  belowu,  includin  the  4  These  are  retumed  to village
elderly,  children below  12,  veterans, the  Tambon  ommittee  heads
handicapped,  and monks. With this  2 The village head,  In
expansion,  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3  5  consultation with the  village
expansion,  LICS changed its name from  V  committees,  selects and lists
the medical welfare  scheme for the low-  Village Committee  those believed  eligible
income to the medical welfare scheme  2  3 The list is debated and
I  amended where relevant by
for underprivileged  groups.  VIllage  Head  the  Tambon committee
4  In the district the cards are
The other major set of changes  1  produced and  stamped The  other major  set  of changes  1  ~~~~~~~~~6  5 The  cards  are sent  back to
introduced in the implementation of  the village head
LICS concerns the dissemination  of  -Applicants  Successful  6  The village head  distnbutes
Applicants  - the  card to the successful information on the LICS allocation  Applicants  applicants
process, as lack of information was  Source:IGilson._1998
considered a major obstacle to coverage of the poorest. Accordingly the village head was given a more
active role  in the application  procedure:  he was made responsible for announcing the scheme one month
Exchange  rate  June 2002, 42  31  baht/dollar
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  55before the deadline  for application and for conducting a house to house survey to ask people to complete
their applications.
The identifical ion of the poor is conducted at the community  level, primarily by village and Tambon (sub
district) leaders.  The official procedure for screening the poor that was introduced  in  1981  is depicted in
Figure  11 Y'A committee headed  by the village  leader examines the application  forms that are submitted
by applicants.  Then a preliminary  list of beneficiaries is produced  by the village  head in conjunction with
the village committee. This list is then screened and amended by the sub district  level: Since  its
implementation  in  1981,  the participation of the community  in the screening procedures  has been
gradually sirengthened by adding new members to the village committee.  Most importantly,  health
workers were  included  in the screening process as it was argued that committee members  from outside of
the health sector did not understand  well enough LICS procedures.  Also, there was much concern that the
village leaders might allocate cards according to their own criteria or needs.  Finally, the power of the
village head was further counterbalanced  by a regulation introduced in  1987 whereby the person
responsible for the Tambon health center checked the list of eligible candidates drawn  up by each village
in the Tambon and by adding new local actors to improve judgments about eligibility.
People who  qualify are given a beneficiary  card valid for three years. The card specifies  one or two
designated heaLlth facilities -normally,  they are local health  centers or district hospitals-  for beneficiaries
to visit in case  of illness or injury. The program requires beneficiaries to seek medical care from the
Tambon health center as a first point of entry into the system. Health center staff will then determine
whether to refer patients for which they will be provided with free care.  For emergencies,  eligible
cardholders  can go to any public facility (Somchai, [year?]).  Under the free care program, poor
individuals  whio do not hold a card are classified by an ad hoc procedure on arrival at the government
facility and exempted totally or partially from  fees.40
Special funds are set aside to compensate facilities  for waived  services.  A budget is allocated to the
provincial  level and  is financed through general revenue.  The Government of Thailand (GOT) has used a
number of criteria for allocating the LICS budget to provinces, including population  size, number of
health facilities, and number of card holders,  standardized mortality ratios, and workload.
LICS has undergone modifications that reflect difficulties experienced with targeting. Several revisions
have focused on strengthening community based screening processes  involving a wider range of key
participants  and in particular village volunteers (Gilson et al., 1998).  More recently Thailand  has
introduced radical changes in health policy, with a shift towards universal health insurance coverage.
VHCS and  LICS are to be substituted gradually by the so called  "30 Baht health policy" launched in
February 2001.  With the new policy all uninsured citizens would receive  a universal health card.
Individuals  must produce this new card when seeking care in either public or private facilities registered
with the government for this initiative, along with some other individual  identification.  The accessing
health service has to follow the referral  system from the primary health  center or the nearby hospital.  For
emergencies and accidents, the insured can access any government health services.  All beneficiaries must
contribute a copayment of 30 Baht ($0.71) per visit. 4'  The 30 Baht Universal  Coverage Policy, the
insured will receive a predefined package of health services, which includes most health services except
cosmetic care, obstetric delivery beyond two pregnancies, drug addiction treatment, hemodialysis, organ
transplantation,  infertility treatment,  and other high cost interventions. From the government  side, the
funding of the system is paid by capitation.  The annual per capita payment,  which comes from general
tax revenue is  1,404 Baht, part of which is paid to the health care facilities according to the number of
Gilson et al.  1998.
40  They are called Type  B"  patients,  distinguishing them from Type 'A' patients.
41,  Exchange rate  in  June 2002: 42.31  baht = $1  00.
3.  Empincal  evidence on protection mechanisms  56cardholders  registered with them (APHEN, 2001; The Nation 2002).  Since this new scheme was just
started evaluation is still lacking.  Main concerns raised by analysts are insufficient funding to finance the
scheme,  incentives for facilities to avoid the provision of high cost and incentives to switch to the 30 baht
health card for people insured under other systems (The Nation 2002).  It is worth mentioning that more
recently Thailand has opted away from mechanisms specifically  focused on exempting the poor from user
fees and has instead started to promote  a scheme under which all the non insured Thai are eligible for
coverage against paying a moderate copayment  (30 baht) per episode. The financial viability of this
scheme remains to be seen as it might create  incentives for the insured to switch to this system.
(d)  Results42
In  1998, the numbers of beneficiaries of all categories  (low income, elderly,  handicapped etc.) was
approximately 17.6 million or 29 percent of the population. Low income card holders represented
approximately  5.8 million of total beneficiaries (Table 21). According to a more recent source, by the
year 2000 LICS covered  as much as 37 percent of the total population (Tangcharoensathien  2001).
Data on coverage  of the target groups and leakage to non eligible beneficiaries varies.  According to
studies by Supachutikul  (1996) and Mongkolsmai  (1993), in the early 1990s coverage of the Ministry of
Health target group (people below income cut off points) was equal to about 76 percent.  Also coverage
of the poor living below the national  poverty line appears to have increased from the range  30 percent-40
percent  in the late  1980s to around 80 percent in the early 1990s. This sharp increase in coverage  is not
confirmed by all studies.  According to research by the National Institute of Development Assistance,
NIDA, serious problems exist with respect to both coverage  and leakage.  A survey showed that about
one-third of responding households were  poor, and only 32 percent of them had the low-income  cards.
Furthermore, there seem to be problems of leakage as only 55  percent were poor according to the family
income criteria (Sriracha Charoenparij,  et al.,  1999). Leakage of benefits to the non-poor may reflect the
fact that official eligibility income criteria are above the official poverty  line and therefore many of the
non-poor are included in LICS's target population.
Additionally,  it seems that LICS beneficiaries  are not always sufficiently well protected from health care
payments.  A  1993 study found that that those holding the LICS spent 6.1  percentof annual income on
health as compared to the 0.6 percent to 2.3 percent spent by other insured  groups (Pannarunothai and
Mills,  1993).  Various studies explain this situation with data indicating that LICS cardholders often do
not use their card to access services and prefer to pay rather than to receive free services under LIC. As
has been already illustrated  by Kartu Sehat in Indonesia, this is a situation that seems to apply not only to
Thailand.  High coverage  of documents certifying eligibility for exemptions does not seem to be a proof of
effectiveness of protection mechanisms.
Table  21  Thailand: Number of low-income cardholders  by region,  1981-1998 (millions)
1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1998'  1998 2
Central  1.84  166  129  182  182  0 75  3.24
Northeast  4 99  4.52  3.50  5.57  5 57  2 97  8 14
North  2.97  2.72  1.85  2.39  2 39  1.40  3.94
South  1.10  1.23  978  1 64  1 64  0,69  2 33
Bangkok  0.00  0,03  0,022  0,08  0,08  0,02  0 03
Total  10.89  1016  7 64  11.50  11  82  5 79  17 67
Source.  Charoenparij  et al, 1999 based on data from the Rural Health Division, MOPH, Thailand.
Notes:
'  Reported Figures for the low-income cards  issued in 1998
2  Reported  figures for all types of cards issued to the underprivileged  (low income and other groups)
42  Discussion is limited to LIC  as the '30  baht policy" is still in its first months of implementation.
3.  Empirical evidence on  protection mechanisms  57The budget set aside to cover exemptions for card holders and other poor patients has increased five fold
in real terms between  1988 and  1997 (Table 22). It is however estimated that it is below the amount of
revenue foregone due to exemptions.  According to a study by Donaldson (1999), in  1997, the budget was
about 30 percent below expenditure for exempted patients.  The remainder was cross-subsidized  from each
hospital's own revenue generated  from user charges and insurance  plans (Table 23).
The problem of inadequate funding is  Table 22 Thailand: Resources  for LICS, 1988-97
worsened  by a problem  of inequitable  Number of
geographic allocations where wealthier  people covered  Budget in  current
regions seem to receive higher per  Year  by the program  prices (million  Budget in  1993 prices regions seem  to  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~ear(million)  baht)  (million baht)
capita allocations than poorer regions  1988  7  65  706  901
(Table 24) even though the situation has  1989  7  65  800  936
improved as the allocation has come  1990  10 73  1,500  1,736
closer to a capitation  based formula.  1991  10 73  2,000  2,205
1992  11.70  2,500  2,625
Gilson et al. (1998)  carried out  1993  11  70  2,750  2,750
community based field research which  1994  11.80  4,273  3,876
showed that thre card is greatly valued by  1995  11.80  4,475  4,059
the people because "it protects the  1996  14 00  5,706  4,929
poorest against the cost of both minor  1997  15 00  6,703  5,515
and more serious illness  and for higher  Source  Somchai Suksir'serekul,  1998 based  on database of office of health
income groups it provides a safety net:  insurance
free access to government care in cases
of expensive  chronic or serious illnesses, or illnesses not effectively treated by other providers."  Despite
these successes Gilson and her colleagues  identified various obstacles to further success of LIC among
which:
*  The  multiple  vulnerabilities  and  marginal  situation  of the poor which  makes  it difficult to reach
them: they tend to live further off and work  longer hours, making it more difficult to disseminate
the iniformation  and to persuade them to apply for the health card.
'I've  never been issued an  LICS card.  I've never come across any messages on it. Anyway,  it could be
possible that  my house is isolated from  the rest of the community  and I don't have  much time to chat
with neighbors.  I've been working as an aide for an old,  long-term  patient from 7  o'clock in the moming
till 6 or 7  o'clock in  the afternoon..  I might be too busy to get messages." (Gilson et al.,  1998)
*  The  difficulty  in  using  formal  Table 23 Thailand:  Budget and expenditure  of the LIC,
income  criteria,  when  most of  1987-1997
applicants  belong  to  the  Resources allocated to
informal  sector,  are  highly  Year  finance exemptions  Loss due to exemptions
mobile,  and  receive  some  in-
kind income.  1987  705,839,500  2,051,856,237
kind imrcome.
1991  2,000,000,000  2,345,067,875
1997 43  ~~6,370,524,000  9,018,341,515
*  Use  of  the  power  to  allocate  S997rc  Donaldson  189,
Source.  Donaldson  1999
cards  for  personal  favors  and  Note.  Expenditures are not true measures of costs of service,  rather of the
political purposes.  charges not paid by LICS patients
*  A  negative  perception  of public  service  quality by the  poor and many cardholders  prefer  not to
use LICS
43 Note that the numbers  quoted by Somchai Suksiriserekul, 1998, do not coincide with the information contained  in the report  by
Donaldson  1999
3.  Empirical evidence  on protection mechanisms  58Table 24.  Thailand: LICS per capita budget allocation by region (baht),  1992-1999
1994  1996  1998  1999
Northeast  132  140  205  264
North  194  193  263  306
South  323  160  239  273
Central  539  183  258  316
Central Northeast  4 08. 1 00  1 38: 1 00  1 16: 1 00  1.20.  1 00
Source:
*  Insufficient funding  (as confirmed  by the data contained  in Table 23). Poor experience  with cost
and quality of service provided  under LIC discourages some  low income  people to apply for the
card and use it to obtain health care.
'I never got free drugs. I  had to pay every visit'
"Since  I got the card,  I have never used it. I did  not know when  and how to use the  card.  I hear that
clients using  the card would  obtain only  low quality drugs and  had to wait  longer.  Clients  who pay for
treatment would  get the  service  first.  I prefer  buying  drugs.  Having  LIC  was  good  but  it also  has
disadvantages.  My sister in law  used it at the hospital  They did not pay  attention to us. They thought
we did not have money,  they paid less attention to us..  "(Gilson et al.,  1998).
*  Stigmatization  of the poor,  which deters  some  card holders  from  using their rights  under LICS.
Low  income  card  holders  feel  that  health  workers  discouraged  them  from  using  their  cards
making them feel inferior and embarrassed.
'Sometimes  I  self-treat  because I  do not want [the health worker] to complain  that I often get free drugs
from the health centre" (Ibid.)
(e)  Lessons learned
Thailand's overall record is quite outstanding when compared to most other countries. First of all,
Thailand's  LICs covers possibly as much as 80 percent of its target population and,  as has been shown by
the study of Gilson and colleagues (1998), the card is greatly valued by many beneficiaries.  Also, the
extensive experience with the program  has allowed  the govemment to gradually strengthen LICS by
increasing community participation, changing  income cutoff points,  increasing funds to reimburse
institutions, adjusting formulas to allocate resources meant to cover expenses and,  more recently,  by
reconsidering the criteria to identify the poor.
As was noted, only about  13 percent of the Thai population, or 7.9 million people,  live below the national
poverty line (Somchai  1998). Yet by the year 2000 LICS  had reached about 37 percent of the total
population.  Thus, the number of program beneficiaries  greatly exceeds the number of poor people in the
country.  Coverage reaches not only part of the poor but also many non poor.  This is mainly explained  by
the adoption of an eligibility threshold that stands above the poverty line and by the inclusion of other
groups (among which children  below 12 and monks) many of which might not be poor.  It remains an
open question whether Thailand should try to limit LICS to the poorest by redefining  its cut off points or
even replacing them by other poverty proxies.  Better targeting would allow the program to provide more
funding for exemptions and might thereby improve quality of services given to LICS patients. As regards
the implementation process the following are some lessons:
*  The effectiveness  of a  protection  system  cannot  be measured  in terms  of leakage  and  coverage
only.  It is crucial that beneficiaries  actually access the free services.
*  Users may prefer to pay for health services rather than receive low quality services.
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection  mechanisms  59*  The  multiple  dimensions  of vulnerability  of the  poor  require  careful  design  of the  protection
mechanisms.
*  It  is difficult to assess  an applicant's  income  level  as they usually work  in the  informal  sector,
has e irregular and mobile jobs, and receive some income  in-kind.
*  When designing screening bodies to identify the beneficiary population, careful  consideration  has
to be given to skills and  incentives  of its members.  The Thai  experience  shows that community
leaders had  incentives  to allocate  exemptions to pay personal and political  favors and  lacked the
skil ls ito identify the poor by themselves.
*  Uncornpensated  free care created incentives  to provide low quality services.
*  Geographic  allocation formulas of budget influence effectiveness  of protection mechanisms.
*  Thailand  has  made  irregular  and  sporadic  adjustments  to  its  income  cut  off points.  Adjusting
them according to changes (for example inflation) seems to be highly desirable.
*  Lack of consistency  between eligibility  criteria and the national  poverty  lines can create  serious
problems.  In the  case  of Thailand  it has  led  to substantial  leakage  of program  benefits  as many
card holders are not poor but are eligible for a health card.
3.8  Chile's Nacional Health  Fund"
(a)  Context
Chile is an upper middle-income country that exhibits some of the best health status indicators both
among Latin  American countries and among countries  in its income category. With a life expectancy  at
birth of 75 yeaLrs,  infant mortality of 10 per thousand life births, and annual per capita  income of $8.440
(PPP-adjusted), Chile is the richest country in the case study sample, and the one with the best health
indicators.
Chile has a mixed health care system, with both financing and production  in public and private hands.
Health insurance coverage is mandatory for formnal  sector workers who, according to a law passed in
1981,  have to devote 7 percent oftheir payroll either for public or private health insurance.  There is a
single, large public insurer known as the National Health Fund (Fondo Nacional  de Salud, FONASA),
and there are rnultiple, competing private health  insurers known as Instituciones de Salud Previsional
(ISAPREs), as; well as traditional commercial  indemnity insurance  firms.
In principle, all Chileans are free to choose between  FONASA and the ISAPREs. In practice, however,  it
is a person's level of income and age that determines whether he or she becomes affiliated with the public
insurer or with one of the several ISAPREs.  FONASA covers middle, lower-middle, and low income
people, whereas ISAPREs cover middle, upper-middle,  and high income individuals.  Also, the active  or
retired elderly are often unable to enter the ISAPRE system  owing to the high premiums that they face;
many choose lo enroll in FONASA.
Approximately three fourths of the population is covered by FONASA and one-fourth by the ISAPREs.
FONASA receives  about 40 percent of its funding through subsidies from the national treasury and 60
percent through contributions by beneficiaries.  Contributions consist mainly of the 7 percent social
This case is based on  Batran  (2000) and  on information  provided directly by current and forrner FONASA officers
3.  Empirical evidence on protection mechanisms  60insurance payroll withholdings and to a much  lesser extent of co-payments  made by patients in
government  health facilities. The ISAPREs are self-financed  through the 7 percent payroll deductions and
additional  contributions made by voluntary members.  Forty percent of FONASA's beneficiaries  have
been classified as "indigent individuals"; these make neither payroll contributions to FONASA nor
payments in public  facilities.  Health services to them are free of charge but only when obtained from
public health facilities.  The other 60 percent of those covered by FONASA are known as the contributing
affiliates and their dependents.  They are those who make their payroll contributions and who, when using
public or private  facilities, make co-payments that increase  with their income.
(b)  User fee policy
User fees have been in place in Chile's public  hospitals for over two decades now, but they represent only
a marginal part of public health facilities'  revenue.  Bitran et al. (2000) estimated that in  1995  user fees
revenue in government  hospitals accounted  for only  11  percent of total revenue.  User fee revenue is
retained  at facilities and can be spent locally according to certain official guidelines.
FONASA pays hospitals for services delivered to its beneficiaries  (the indigent and the contributing
affiliates) according to a mixed payment system that consists primarily of prospective  budgets and to a
lesser extent of payment per case resolved (a simplified version  of the U.S.  Federal Government's
Diagnotic  Related  Groups, DRGs).  Budgets are  calculated according to expected volume of services and
historical expenditures.  Revenue from user fees supplements hospital income  in public hospitals, and
therefore these facilities have an incentive to collect fees.  This seems to be especially true for tertiary
hospitals and for complex procedures where bills can be quite high.  Public  hospitals have been plagued
by chronic deficits and are using resources  from user fees to cover part of their financial gap.  It would
seem, however, that FONASA may be conferring a perverse incentive for fee collection with a recent
policy that bridges the financial gap of hospitals with the largest deficits.  This situation, together with the
administrative costs involved in cost recovery, weakens  incentives to collect user fees.  A former
FONASA official explains:
'Why  should they [public hospital's management]  bother if their expenditures get covered [by FONASA]
anyway?"
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FONASA classifies  its beneficiaries  into groups, from A to D, according to income and socioeconomic
status (Table 25).  Group "A" comprises the indigent.  These are the unemployed  poor or people who,
despite having  some informal  employment or occupation,  are deemed poor and thus are entitled to full
public subsidies for health  care services.  Groups B, C, and D are active workers who fall into these
groups  on the basis of the income.  As income goes up, people move from group B, to C, and to D.  Their
payroll health tax remains a constant 7 percent.  There is a limit to the income that is subject to the  7
percent,  however, currently equal  to about $1,470 per worker per month.45 Thus, those in group B do not
pay any fees in public hospitals but do make the regular payroll tax contribution. Affiliates  in groups C
and D make thieir payroll tax contributions  and pay user fees in public facilities.  In any case, payments
made by benefliciaries  in groups C and D represent only a small part (20 percent at the most) of  the actual
cost of care.




Group  Eligibility criteria  Payroll tax  public hospital
"A"  Persons with 'lack  of resources",  beneficiaries of subsidized pensions,  No  No
beneficiaries of family subsidies (subsidies for children  in low income families)
"B"  Monthly  income below  national  minimum  salary and families with more than  Yes  No
three dependant household members and monthly  income above minimum
salary and below 1 46 minimum salaries
.C.  Monthly  income above minimum salary and below  1.46 minimum  salaries  and  Yes  Yes,  10 percent
less than 3 dependents  Monthly income  above 1 46 minimum  salaries and 3  of  cost of
or more dependants  service
"D"  Monthly income above 1 46 minimum salaries  and less than 3 dependents  Yes  Yes, 20 percent
of cost of service
Source.  Fonasa,  2002
Identification  of the poor is decentralized  and is carried  out both by municipalities  and health facilities.  In
municipalities  clerks are  in charge of selecting the poor; in health facilities this responsibility usually
belongs to a social worker who subjects potential  beneficiaries to an interview for eligibility
determination.  Interviews are often followed by a home  visit, for verification,  or to supplement the
information already collected from the person.  A "free health card"  is handed out once indigence  status is
determined.  Floor patients who do not possess a "free health card" are classified on arrival  by health
facilities.  "Lack of resources" is the main eligibility criterion to get a free health card (Group A). There
are no specific guidelines  for establishing what constitutes "lack of resources"  and it is very much up to
the judgment of the officer in charge.  There is no supervision of this eligibility determination process.
(d)  Results"
Table 26 presents "actual"  and "imputed" number of affiliates according to information  from the 2000
CASEN national household  survey.  Actual status is determined  based on the respondent's self-
declaration  (respondents  were required to produce the FONASA card for the survey).  A person  is
considered to be an actual FONASA affiliate if he or she declares to hold a FONASA card. Imputed
status was defined as the one the person should have (i.e., the FONASA group where he or she should be)
based on poverty status and cash income  level.  There is almost total coverage of  the poor as only I  1
45  This means  that the maximum,  legally-required  payroll contribution is  $103  FONASA does not receive more than this
amount from anyone  ISAPREs,  however,  are allowed to charge an additional amount  above this maximum mandated  contribution,
if that maximum  does not suffice to pay for the premium  of a given ISAPRE  health plan.
46  Mainly based  on  Bitran et al,  2000a
3.  Empircal  evidence on protection mechanisms  62percent (15.064) of individuals that should belong to FONASA A group are not covered by any health
insurance. Further, even those poor that do not hold a free health card usually obtain free health services
quite easily through  a means test conducted at the facility, as mentioned earlier.
Table 26: Chile: Self-declared  and  imputed  FONASA group, 2000
Declared FONASA  Imputed  FONASA group according to CASEN47
Group
A  B  C  D  Total
A  89,390  529,729  140,514  242,715  1,002,348
B  22,550  647,805  384,794  448,835  1,503,984
C  4,412  139,864  183,343  279,140  606,759
D  3,500  104,790  114,538  520,511  743,339
Unknown  1,856  30,398  22,999  43,231  98,484
Military  184  15,790  12,173  155,513  183,660
ISAPRE  2,283  76,715  92,926  1,182,015  1,353,939
Ninguno  15,064  196,286  71,463  317,603  600,416
Otro  190  4,382  1,996  12,523  19,091
No sabe  610  18,475  10,194  20.834  50,113
Total  140,039  1,764,234  1,034,940  3,222,920  6,162,133
Source.  Bitran and Associates based  on Casen  2000 household survey
Note  FONASA imputed  groups are  obtained  by applying  groups defined by FONASA  to income  information  from Casen
FONASA A group is  imputed  by applying the  national poverty  line to the  income data  provided in Casen.  Table  excludes
dependents.
Also, FONASA  is highly progressive  in the delivery of its health benefits. Table 27 shows per capita
benefits, contributions,  and subsidies for the four FONASA groups from a study based on data from the
early nineties (Bitran et al. 2000).  Per capita benefits for group A and B are substantially  higher than
benefits of groups C and D, reflecting the more  intensive use of FONASA'S  network of health facilities
by the poorer groups.  In other words, there is a progressive  inequality in the distribution of benefits in
favor of the poor -one that may help to bridge an  equity gap in delivery of health services in the country
(note that beneficiaries of groups B, C, and D may make  use of private, unsubsidized health care, and that
this information  is not shown in the table).  Health financing also seems progressive.  As can be seen from
the table, per capita contributions  increase with income, going from Ch $7,461  for group A to Ch.
$70,479 for group D.  Progressivity would appear even greater if non-health taxes, such as income and
property taxes, were also accounted  for in the exercise.
47  Imputed FONASA  group refers to the  FONASA group should belong to  according to their income level  Declared  FONASA  group
refers  to the  FONASA group individuals actually belong  to according to  Casen  2000
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FONASA Group
B, C and
A  B  C  D  Total A-D  D only
Estimated  nurnber of beneficiaries  3,664,733  2,806,016  1,050,634  946,484  8,467,867  4,803,134
Benefits
Primary Care  6,247  4,691  3,388  2,249  4,930  3,925
Secondary Care  7,513  8,134  2,806  2,883  6,617  5,934
Tertiary Care  38,289  31,346  9,261  10,377  29,267  22,383
Subtotal Primary, secondary and tertiary  52,049  44,170  15,455  15,509  40,814  32,241
care
Free-Choice  Modality  794  11,608  17,927  19,053  8,544  14,457
Pregnancy ancl Illness Subsidies  932  4,381  5,833  7,401  3,406  5,294
DFL  36 (additional private sector care)  1,507  1,283  438  447  1,182  933
Total benefits  55,282  61,442  39,654  42,409  53,945  52,926
Contributions
7 Percent Payroll Contributions  6,987  32,851  43,739  55,495  25,539  39,695
Co-payments  in Public Facilities  0  0  3,515  3,586  837  1,475
Free Choice Modality Co-payments  475  6,944  10,725  11,398  5,111  8,649
Total contnbutions  7,461  39,794  57,979  70,479  31,487  49,819
Source  Bitran and Associates, 2000.  Values are Ch$ at December 1995.
More recently,  however, there has been much turmoil when FONASA discovered  in 2001  that as many
as half a million of the presumed indigent in group A were actually taxpayers who on average  made,
annual income tax payments above Ch. $3,000,000 (about US$ 4,500).  This finding was made possible
through an administrative breakthrough  whereby FONASA was for the first time granted permission to
cross check  information  on its affiliates with information  on income tax contributions from the internal
revenue service.  This situation is confirmed by results of the 2000 CASEN survey.  Table 26 shows that
of a total of 1,002,348  self-declared Group A affiliates, only 9 percent are poor according to the national
poverty line. F  urther,  almost 40 percent of group A affiliates have income levels that would put them in
FONASA' groups C and D.  Overall, the number of FONASA beneficiaries  in Group A exceeds by a
factor of seven the country's population falling below the poverty line. The problem in Chile is clearly
related to leakage  and not so much to coverage.  Some of the factors explaining this situation are the
following:
*  There  are  no  clear  rules  regarding  what  criteria to  apply  in  health  facilities  when  determining
poverly.  "Lack of resources"  is a very vague term.  When  asking a  former official  on how they
decided  on whether a person would be given the "free health card"  or not he said:
'When  we  [at  the  hospital]  decided  on  whether someone  was  to  be given  the  free  health  card"  or  not  it
depended very much on  how much a patient would cry  .'
*  There  are incentives  to cheat  as Group A patients receive  in practice the same benefits  as Group
B patients even though  those in Group A make no contributions  of any kind to FONASA  while
Group  B  beneficiaries  make  a  monthly  contribution  equivalent  to  7  percent  of their  monthly
income.
*  There are no clear incentives to identify the poor correctly.  In Chile, municipalities'  income is not
linked to cost recovery.  Also, municipalities  are not responsible  for the financial  performance  of
public  hospitals.  Under  this  condition,  municipalities  do  not  have  strong  incentives  to  avoid
3.  Empirical  evidence on protection  mechanisms  64leakage  when  identifying  the  poor  and  possibly  do  have  incentives to  gain  political  favors  by
giving "free  health cards".
(e)  Lessons learned
The implementation of a protection mechanism for the poor in Chile reveals several  challenges that are of
interest for countries willing to engage  in similar processes.  Chile has reached almost all of  the poor
through FONASA and the poor seem to be accessing health services  much the same as the richer
segments of the population. Problems are associated with leakage and not so much with coverage:
When designing protection  mechanisms careful consideration  must be given to who determines
eligibility. The case of Chile illustrates that countries have to choose entities in charge of determining
eligibility in a way that strikes a balance between health facilities  interest in collecting revenue and
administrative or political entities possible interest to pay favors by allocating  cards to the non poor.
When designing protection  mechanisms for the poor under user fees, careful attention has to be given to
possible incentives created  for the contributing richer population.  In Chile such incentives clearly exist as
the benefits  for the indigent and the non poor are the same in practice. Group "A" beneficiaries  are
completely exempted from payments and get basically the same benefits as Group "B" "C" and "D"
beneficiaries  which make payroll contributions and pay user fees (with the exception  of group "B").
Under this circumstance, strong  incentives exist for potential  beneficiaries to get classified as Group "A"
beneficiaries.
The case of FONASA in Chile illustrates once again the importance of clearly defining the eligibility
criteria. In Chile no consensus seems to exist as to how to interpret "lack of resources".
It is crucial to implement effective monitoring mechanisms capable of measuring coverage and tracking
problems of leakage.  Chile recently made a great leap forward when deciding to cross check its data base
of FONASA beneficiaries  with the data base of the Tax Administration.  It was the integration of data
bases that allowed Chile to detect a massive problem of leakage.
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This final chapter summarizes the findings from case study countries  and draws  lessons about best
practices.  Section 4.1  reviews the performance of waiver and exemption  systems.  Section 4.2 comments
on the financinig of protection  mechanisms  and the kinds of health benefits they covered.  It also discusses
general design  and implementation  features, particularly those regarding beneficiary eligibility.  Sections
4.3 and 4.4 examine design and implementation  aspects of waivers  and exemptions that influence,
respectivelv,  provider behavior (or the supply of waivers and exemptions) and consumer behavior (the
demand for waivers and exemptions).  Finally, Section 4.5 offers concluding remarks about best practices.
4.1  Performance  of waiver and exemption systems
(a)  Performance  monitoring and evaluation
Performance  assessment for all cases studied  is hampered by a lack of evaluation.  None of the cases
reviewed systematically monitors performance  in terms of who the beneficiaries  of waivers  and
exemptions  are and what is the influence of these protection mechanisms  on access and out-of-pocket
health  spending by the poor.  The  lack of monitoring is a major weakness of waiver and exemptions
systems, as the consequences of these cannot be regularly assessed and the policies thereby  evaluated.  In
all cases performance  indicators come from ad-hoc studies.  Regular monitoring of pro-poor protection
systems  should at a minimum, through routine facility recording and via periodic household  surveys
*  Record exemptions and waivers granted.
*  When  using  individual  targeting,  establish  a  data  base  containing  basic  information  on
beneficiaries such as identity number,  name, age, sex and geographic  location
*  Compare actual exemption and waiver levels with targets.
*  Estimate coverage and leakage of protection  mechanisms.
(b)  Targeting  methods used
Table 28 describes the targeting, or beneficiary  identification  method used, and presents a summary of
performance  indicators,  including coverage of the target group, leakage, administrative cost, access to
health services by beneficiaries  of the protection mechanism,  and effect of protection on out-of-pocket
health spending ("financial burden").
Targeting methods to provide waivers were in some cases a combination of geographic targeting  and
individual means testing (Kenya, Ghana, Indonesia, Thailand), while in others they were only based  on
individual means tests (Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and Chile).  By combining geographic with individual
targeting,  some countries,  such as Ghana and Zimbabwe, attempted to improve equity in the allocation of
public subsidies for health by compensating providers  in a system that linked incremental  public subsidies
to the level of waivers provided.  Others, such as Kenya, also combined group and individual targeting
but did not accompany the policy of granting waivers by a stream of compensating subsidies.  Countries
which only use individual targeting, such as Cambodia, could eventually  improve equity in the allocation
of public subsidies for health if they incorporated geographic targeting criteria.
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'E co  E  cmr-  CL  0  -2  c,  cj  ~  ~  ~  I- Cambodia has been attempting to reallocate the government's budget for health care on the basis of
regional  poverty.  Success, so far, has been limited, as shown in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-
reference..  The figure shows the per capita government health budget allocated to each province  in  1999,
normalized  between 0 and  1, and the equally normalized  illiteracy rate (as a proxy for poverty)  in the
same year.  To be equitable, the allocation of public health budgets should at least be correlated with
illiteracy,  or follow the same pattern as illiteracy.  Both measures are indeed positively correlated, with a
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.39.  This means that the government has allocated  its recurrent health
budget more or less according to illiteracy,  generally sending more money per capita where illiteracy (and
thus poverty)  is high, and less where illiteracy  is low.  Yet the correlation  is weak and there are grave
exceptions.  It can be seen from the figure that many provinces where illiteracy is relatively high -
Kampong Speu and Siam Reap are examples-  the per capita recurrent  public budget is relatively low.
Cambodia rnay be a special  case because of the country's high reliance on donor assistance  in the health
sector, although  user fees constitute the bulk of health financing, and in these high-illiteracy provinces the
public budget  is inequitably too low.  Increasing the per capita allocation of public resources in the
poorest provinces of Cambodia would enable the health facilities  substantially to lower their user fees, or
to remove thern completely.  Such a reallocation  would be equitable on a national scale and it would
greatly improve access to health services  by the poor living in those provinces.
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In the poorest countries reviewed, particularly in Kenya and Ghana, coverage of the poor by waiver
mechanisms was low.  This is not surprising since in Kenya health care providers were not reimbursed for
the value of services  given to waived patients.  In fact, in Kenya members of the health staff were
reluctant to grant waivers.  In Ghana there was financial compensation  to providers  for free care (see
Table 30), but the flow of funds was uneven and late.  In countries  such as Cambodia  and Indonesia
coverage of the poor was low either because of a lack of funds (Indonesia) or because the system was new
and there was limited awareness about it among the target population.  Countries with high coverage,
Thailand  and Chile, were also the countries richest in the sample.  Both those countries, however, had
high levels of leakage.  This is not surprising since both defined income  levels for eligibility way above
their official poverty line.
4. Lessors and best practice  68Virtually no information was available about the administrative  cost of waiver systems.  Cambodia's  EF
kept track of administrative costs or had had their costs evaluated.  Such costs were high in projects which
had a high component of (relatively very expensive) expatriate labor -Sotnikum  and Phnom Penh Urban
Health Project.
Likewise the is no systematic  effort in place  in any of the case countries to assess the impact that
protection systems have had on rates of utilization of health services  and on out-of-pocket expenditure by
the poor.  The ad-hoc evaluations conducted  in Cambodia suggest that EF do promote greater utilization
of services by the poor.  In rural areas (Sotnikum) this requires that the protection mechanism not only
waive poor patients from use fees in health facilities, but also that they reimburse these patients for their
health-seeking related costs, such as travel and food.  Evidence from Chile (Bitran  1995)  also shows that
the beneficiaries of waivers enjoy utilization rates for some services that are  as high as those of higher-
income,  self-financed  affiliates of the public  insurer.
4.2  Financing of waivers  and  exemptions  and  design and implementation
features
(a)  Funding
With the exception of Chile and Cambodia's EFs, all other case study countries were characterized by a
lack of public funding to pay for waivers and exemptions.  Kenya simply did  not contemplate the creation
of a fund to pay for the incremental  cost of waivers in public health facilities.  Ghana, Zimbabwe,
Indonesia, and Thailand had such a fund but the level of resources allocated  to it was insufficient to
finance waivers for the entire target group.  Thailand's case is peculiar because  although that country had
not been able to cover all of the poor with its free health cards  (it covered  only 80 percent of them), it had
a high level of leakage.  Indeed,  it is estimated that 45 percent of card holders were above the national
poverty line.  Thus, Thailand did not lack funds to finance  its waiver policy, but rather was poorly using
its available  funding.  Cutting some of the leakage to non-poor beneficiaries would  free up enough
revenue to finance free cards for the uncovered  poor.  Chile's situation was in a way similar to
Thailand's:  coverage of the poor was even higher, but according to recent estimates,  leakage was
substantial.  A reduction  in leakage, if at all possible, would enable Chile's government to provide more
and better care  for the poor, or to reduce general taxes.
(b)  Health  benefits  covered
Most countries  in this review failed to define explicitly the  set of benefits  subject to waivers and
exemptions particularly  as it pertains to curative services.  Cambodia  is making at attempt at defining two
basic packages, the minimum and the complementary package of health services, the first for health
centers and the second for hospitals.  However,  the prospect of granting waivers that would cover the
entire set of services in these packages has not been contemplated to date.  Chile's National  Health Fund
explicitly states that all primary  and preventive  health services provided in ambulatory health facilities are
to be given at no charge to its beneficiaries.  In the case of hospital-based  services all care  is supposedly
to be given to the indigent, yet limited funding often results in rationing through waiting periods which
can last several months.
(c)  Existence  and  clarity of national  policy of waivers  and exemptions
With the exception of Cambodia,  all other countries  in the review had an explicit national waiver policy
and all had an explicit  policy for exemptions  (all exempted certain categories of preventive  services for all
citizens).  At the same time, most of the case study countries included in this paper have experienced
problems related to their eligibility criteria.  Lack of clear identification  criteria seems to be one major
problem.  Often, telling the poor from the non-poor depends to a large extent on the subjective criteria of
4. Lessons and best practice  69the person in charge of determining  eligibility.  In Kenya,  for example, staff in government health
facilities used  10 different poverty proxies to establish eligibility for waivers.  In Ghana health facilities
seem to have several different definitions  of the term "pauper",  or the subjects of waivers.  Likewise, in
Chile there  exist multiple criteria for determining eligibility and this has been a source of conflict between
different government entities over some patients.  In Chile, municipalities and hospitals often disagree on
which of  the patients are to be waived.  Other countries experiencing similar programs  have gradually
improved clarity of eligibility criteria.  Such is the case of Indonesia which has now established four
criteria to idlentify the poor.  In Thailand, the identification  of the poor was initially up to the discretion of
directors of public facilities but was later substituted by an income cutoff point.  The lack of clear
guidelines for granting waivers for user fees diminishes hampers the success of the waiver policy, and
makes the monitoring of success a difficult task, and paves the way for a misallocation  of subsidies
through leakage.
Formnulating clear  identification criteria is a necessary but insufficient condition to make a system of
waivers work.  It is also crucial that identification  criteria be applicable  and easily verifiable.  In
Zimbabwe,  for example,  establishing eligibility proved cumbersome  if not impossible since target
beneficiaries were required to produce information  sometimes not available to them.  Thailand  established
an income cutoff point for eligibility, but since the target population belongs mostly to the informal
sector, is highly mobile, and receives  some in kind  income, determining  actual income is difficult and
subject to arbilrariness.  The foregoing  discussion leads to a questioning of the appropriateness of using
the income criiterion  alone for eligibility determination.  Case information points to a need to complement
to combine the  income criterion with other information,  or to drop it as use instead other, more observable
poverty proxies.  In this respect there is general such thing as a general  prescription  except that the
definition of poverty ought to respond to local circumstances  and be adapted to the specific cultural
context.
(d)  Taking into account the multiple dimensions of vulnerability of the poor
In most cases r eviewed here, possibly with the exception of Chile, the poor often are deterred from
claiming waivers as they feel ashamed of being poor.  In Cambodia the staff of a large public clinic in
Phnom Penh requires that waiver applicants be subject to a public means test in front of all other persons
in the waiting room.  Shame commonly leads to prospective applicants to forego their right to request a
waiver.  In 'rhailand, stigma also seems to be a problem  limiting access by the poor, as the following
statement  illustrates:
"Sometimnes  I self-treat  because  I do  not  want  [the  health worker]  to complain  that I often get free
drugs from the health  centre"  [a poor from Thailand] (Gilson,  1998)
A similar situation was reported by a health official from Ghana:
"On one  occasion  we had  11  patients  who  claimed  they were  paupers  we  infonned  that we would
publish them as paupers  by the following day.  After all of them were photographed  4 of them came to
settle their bill in  full. This is an indication  there are those who can afford to pay and yet will refuse to
pay."  (Garshong, 2001)
(e)  Assigning responsibility for determination  of eligibility
Eligibility may be determined  by persons or entities within or outside of health facilities.  Examples
described in this paper show a variety of situations.  In Kenya and Ghana eligibility is determined by
health  facility staff; in Zimbabwe by social welfare offices; in Thailand,  Indonesia, and in certain
provinces of C'ambodia  by the combined and coordinated work of health staff and other government
officials (for example village  leaders) and clerks; and in Chile by the separate and at times conflicting
action of facility staff and municipal  authorities.  There is no single answer to who should be responsible
for the exempl ion process but those engaged  in eligibility determination  should be aware of the selection
4. Lessons and best practice  70criteria,  adequately trained to carry out their job, and informed about the financial  and other constraints
governing the protection awarding process.
(f)  Updating  fees and  income eligibility thresholds
Most of the countries  have had problems with adjusting fees and income thresholds to changing
circumstances.  In Ghana and Kenya, for example, the real value of user fees real has gradually eroded
due to inflation,  leading to spontaneous and unregulated attempts by providers to update fees in ways that
may defeat the policy objectives.  In Zimbabwe  income cutoff points were not adjusted for inflation
making it gradually more difficult for the poor to be eligible,  and likewise  in Thailand.  When fees and
income eligibility thresholds are not adjusted with circumstances,  de facto protection  policies may drift
away from their original goal: those in the originally-defined  target group are no longer captured by the
income thresholds and facilities may set fee levels in way that may hurt the poor.  It is therefore crucial
that countries wishing to implement protection mechanisms design,  from the very beginning, mechanisms
for regular adjustment of fees and eligibility thresholds.
(g)  Institutional aspects
Clear guidance to implementers and the availability of institutions, resources, and appropriately trained
are essential  for the effective application of pro-poor policies.  No such clarity existed in most cases
reviewed nor was there adequate staffing and supplies to carry out the tasks of waiving patients.  In
Ghana, for example,  facility staff complained about increased workload and cost of stationery associated
with the exemption and waiver procedures.  In Kenya, the administration  of waivers is cumbersome,  on
average lasting about  1-2 hours.  The process of assessing  and exempting patients is thereby often delayed
or postponed.  Countries wishing to implement protection mechanisms  have to be aware that the granting
waivers and exemptions is a complex process that requires institutional  investments.  Those designing the
kinds of protection  mechanisms for the poor discussed in this report should envision those needs for
resources and should therefore  contemplate mechanisms for creating and making them available on a
sustainable  basis.  This means that there should be written guidelines for waivers and exemptions (with
enough  flexibility to allow for regional or local variation  if necessary) and that health facilities or other
agencies granting this protection  should know and be reimbursed for their administrative  costs.
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Initially not, but  Eligibility
Chile  Yies  subsequently  Yes  Yes  criteria  way  Municipalit  NoaviblYe
yes  ~~~~~~~~above  y or facility  Noavibl  Ye
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4. Lessons an-d  best practice  724.3  Design  and implementation  features  influencing the supply of waivers and
exemptions
(a)  Provider compensation
Wilkinson  noted that "there is a systemic conflict between  a viable exemption scheme and a viable salary
incentive scheme,"  in his report on the user fee system  in Cambodia.  By this he meant that it is
unreasonable to expect that underpaid health staff that are responsible for, and have the ability to charge
user fees, will act in accordance with general equity principles by providing appropriate levels of
exemptions.  Improving their income through fees will remain in obvious tension with the social aim of
exempting the poor as long as budgets are  inappropriate  and accountability systems are absent.  More
generally when health facilities are viewed as a whole, there exists an equivalent tradeoff between  the
extent of exemptions and the aim to bridge any gaps in expenses or in revenue objectives through user
fees.
The exemption  component of Kenya's cost recovery policy is likely doomed to failure as long as the
government  does not restore to health facilities the revenue foregone from waivers and exemptions.  Up
until recently, Indonesia faced a similar situation, but currently health care providers do get from the
government  funds that supplement their budgets to defray waivers and exemptions.  Zimbabwe,  Ghana,
Thailand, Chile and, more recently Indonesia, all have in common the existence of compensated funds for
partial  and full exemptions provided  by government  health facilities to patients.
The conclusion from the forgoing analysis is that a well-performing  system of waivers and exemptions in
government health facilities  must be in harmony with institutional  and individual staff objectives.  More
specifically, government  funds or external funding from donors  or lenders,  are required to grant providers
with the appropriate and minimum  financial  incentive to exempt the poor.
(b)  Timeliness of compensation
A corollary of the preceding point is that compensated  user-fee revenue should reach health facilities
promptly.  Only Thailand and Chile meet this requirement.  In Ghana compensation to health facilities
from SDF reportedly takes as  long on 8 months to arrive.  There,  the need by facilities to meet expenses
with concurrent funding  is at odds with delayed reimbursement  by the government.  Where compensation
exists, it must be timely; otherwise the cost of delayed reimbursement (for example  the financial or
opportunity cost) may be transferred by the provider to the poor, in the form of higher fees or lower (or
fewer) exemptions.
Policies seeking to improve the protection of the poor should therefore  seek to streamline any
bureaucracy involved in the reimbursement of facilities for exemptions granted. Reimbursement
procedures  may be timelier  in various ways.  For example, the regular allocation of compensation funds
from the central level to regional  health authorities, or to regional  funds, may make compensation more
opportune and predictable.  Or,  in the absence of a decentralization  framework, monthly budgets sent
from the central level to facilities  may include an "exemptions allowance" equal to the monthly target for
that facility, with any (relatively smaller) adjustments for differences between  actual and budgeted
exemptions being made later.
(c)  Harmonizing  the incentives created  by different payment  mechanisms
Some case studies show that quality of services given to exempted patients is lower than quality for
paying patients.  Such is the case in Thailand.  Even though providers are compensated there, "quality
discrimination"  may well be related to the incentives conferred  by payment methods and levels which
4. Lessons and best practice  73differ across patient groups.  Health facilities are paid mostly on a capitation  basis, and the total capitation
payment  is below the revenue foregone by providers through waivers.  At the same time, facilities get
paid on a fee-for-service  basis by paying patients or by the patients'  insurer. Under this circumstance
facilities have a strong motivation to select the "best paying patients", not only because reimbursement
levels are higher but also because with a capitation-based payment system,  facilities have an incentive to
under-prov  de services,  especially  in the absence of a tight monitoring system.
As the Thai  situation  illustrates, payment mechanisms and payment levels have an impact on the
effectiveness  of protection mechanisms.  Countries adopting poor protection systems where providers are
compensated  for their provision of free or subsidized care to the poor must give serious consideration  to
the payment method and payment level.  Adopting the wrong payment or the wrong level might result in
some "crowdinig out of the poor".
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Supply-side design and  implementation features
Financial
Feature->  Relationship  significance of
between  staff  compensation
Existence and  Compensation of  User fee  remuneration  for exempt
level  administrative  revenue  kept at  and user fee  patients,  relative  Time frame of
Country  of compensation  cost  facility  revenue  to full price  compensation
No: Granting  of
waivers is
Kenya  No  resource intensive  Yes  Staff reluctant to  Not available  Not available but no  give waivers
compensation
available
50%  of revenue
Yes: But it does  can be used to
Cambodia  Yes  not include the  9%  pay for salaries  Compensation  Monthly
cost of expatriate  and accounts for  equal to full fee
staff  up to 95%  of staff
income
Yes- But  Revenue  only to  Evidence that
cumbersome flow  No  Evidence that  i  be  used to pay for  Eidement
Ghana  from central level  facmplties  and staf  subsequentty yes  drugs and other  Not available  lasts on average 4
to  local level  complain  on this  non personnel  months
facilities  expenditures
Yes: Albeit  Reimbursement
cumbersome flow  Inbally  not, but  takes up to 8
Ztmbabwe  from central level  No  subsequently yes  Not available  Not available  months as it
to local level  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~needs  approval
facilities  from  Harare.
Health centers
can keep 25%  of
Initially not,  but  revenue; balance  Delays in





lower than  fees





Yes. But  equal to fees paid
Yes.  Fees paid for  Yes.Btrodny  for patients
exempted patients  bdextralordinary  insured in  the
Chile  equal to fees paid  Not explicit  btu  ent  allout  No  public system.  Not available
for  insured  taker into aclcunt  Provider
patients  use fcollecte  indifferent
between serving
poor or non poor
patient.
4. Lessons and best practice  754.4  Design  and  implementation  features influencing the demand  for waivers  and
exemptions
(a)  Disseminating  pro-poor protection policies and mechanisms
Lack of knowledge  on protection mechanisms by both health staff and potential beneficiaries  is a
recurrent is,ue  in most countries with the exception of Chile, where the poor are screened by public
facilities by an ad-hoc procedure if they have not been previously  identified. Under-coverage  will be a
constant problem when the poor do not know they are eligible for free or subsidized care and when health
facilities are not aware of whom to exempt
In Ghana, for example, most potential beneficiaries were unaware or misinformed about waivers and
exemptions.  Also, health  facilities  were not interested in disseminating information  on waivers  and
exemptions. In Kenya, most inpatients and outpatients were unaware of waivers and exemptions. In
Zimbabwe  many of the poor had not applied for waivers because they did not know of the possibility of
getting wai vers through the SDF.  In Indonesia, neither the poor nor health facilities  knew that the health
card officially entitled the holder to free primary care services and to free referrals.  The problem of
information dissemination seems to be especially  challenging in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia
information  on protection mechanisms  originates at the provincial  level and has to move down to
districts, sub districts, villages, sub villages and finally to health facilities and to the target population.  In
Thailand,  lack of information was considered a major obstacle to coverage of the poorest,  leading to a
series of major changes  in the dissemination  policy.  Accordingly the village head was given  a more
proactive role in the application procedure.  Also, in many countries (e.g., Indonesia) health staff was
seldom trained to grant exemptions and waivers. The following statement from Gibbons (1995) illustrates
this point:
The staff at the health centers and health sub centers did not receive  formal training to explain the uses
and implementation.  In Lombok  Barat village,  there  was  one  meeting with the  health center leaders
and the district health official. The information  given oat the meeting  was minimal. After the meeting,
the healih center leaders were  responsible  for training the  health  sub center  workers.  This training  of
the health  sub  center  workers  consisted  of brief conversations  with  the  head  of the  corresponding
health center.  Little training actually occurred.
Countries wishing to implement mechanisms to mitigate the impact of user fees on the poor have to be
aware that dissemination of policies is not done by circulating a few government leaflets.  A dissemination
policy is effective only when the poor and health staff know about protection  mechanisms. For this to take
place, some general recommendations  can be made:
*  Use  different  media  (newspaper,  radio,  TV,  house  by  house  information,  village  meetings,
schools to disseminate  information on protection mechanisms
*  Tailor dissemination  mechanisms  to  special  characteristics  of the poor.  For  example,  take  into
account  that the poor tend to  live further  off,  have  less  access  to  formal  media,  tend to  be less
educa,ted, and have longer working hours.
*  Introduce  accountability in dissemination  policy. For example make village heads accountable  for
disseminating  information and evaluate performance of officials on this issue.
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Access costs  Social  Discrimination  services without  Existence of
Dissemination of  to exemption  importance of  of the  formal  alternative
Country  information  system  stigma  exempted  exemption  providers
Majority of potential
Kenya  beneficiaries not  Not available  Not available  Not available  No
aware of exemptions
It varies  Sotnikum's  Important
EF currently  according to
Cambodia  promoting  scheme,  No high  anccdiotal  No  No  Notgood
but cautiously, to  infotal
keep EF sustainable  infommabon
Majority of potential
beneficiaries not
Ghana  aware of exemptions,  Not available  Not available  Not available health staff not
knowledgeable of
exemption categories
About 50% of the  Evidence that
Zimbabwe  population  have  participation  Anecdotal
Zimbabwe  never heard  of the  costs  are high  evidence  Not available
waiver policy  and  may deter demand
Evidence that  Yes: Anecdotal
potential beneficiaries  evidence that
Indonesia  exemptions and that  participation  Not available  Not available
health staff does not  cost may deter
know policy well  demand
Problems revealed
that the poor have  Yes, Anecdotal  Yes: Anecdotal
Thailand  difficulties  accessing  Not available  evidence  evidence
information on health
card
Chile  Not available  No  Not available  No
4. Lessons and best practice  77*  Make  sure  no  major incentives  exist to conceal  information  on  protection  mechanisms.  As has
been  shown  earlier,  negative  impact of protection  mechanisms  on  staff's and  facilities  income
may constitute  a major obstacle  to even the most sophisticated  dissemination  policy.  This point
clearly  illustrates  the  strong relationship  that exists  among  many of the  major implementation
issues related with the implementation  of protection mechanisms for the poor.
*  When  the  process  is  implemented  in  a top  down  manner  (from  national  level  to  local  level)
oppontunity  should be given  for discussion  and clarification  between official at different levels on
how  to implement  the  process  and  should  not be  limited  to  physically  passing  on  government
circulars.
4.5  Concliusion
Different countries  have tried different approaches  regarding waivers and exemptions for health services.
Those that have carefully designed and implemented  waiver systems (e.g., Thailand and Indonesia)  have
had much  greaLter success  in terms of benefits incidence  than countries that have improvised  such systems
(Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe).  Key to the success of a waiver system is its financing.  Systems that
compensate  providers for the revenue forgone from granting exemptions (Thailand, Indonesia,  and
Cambodia)  have been more successful  than those who expect the provider to absorb the cost of
exemptions  (Kenya).  Where waiver systems exist, performance  will improve with the timeliness of the
reimbursement.  Other success factors  include the widespread  dissemination  of information among
potential beneFiciaries  about waiver availability and procedures; the awarding of financial  support to poor
patients for non-fee costs of care, such as food and transportation  (as in Cambodia);  and the existence of
clear criteria for the granting of waivers, thereby reducing confusion and ambiguity  among those
responsible  for managing the system and among potential  recipients.  Those facing the task of adopting a
system of waivers face multiple design options.  These include the following, among others:  should
exemptions be granted to whole groups or on the basis of individual targeting (the review finds that most
systems are based on the latter)?  Should waivers or exemptions  be permanent or temporary?  How
frequently  should eligibility be reassessed?  Should waiver eligibility be determined ex-ante, in the
household, or when individuals seek care  in the facility?  The review examines various approaches  taken
by countries, but assessing their relative practical  merits is difficult, as the evidence  is scattered and
mixed.
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In response to shortages  in public budgets for government  health services,  many developing countries
around the world have adopted formal or informal  systems of user fees for health care.  In  most
countries user fee proceeds  seldom  represent more than  15 percent of total  costs  in hospitals  and
health centers,  but they tend to account for a significant share of the resources required  to pay for
no -i-personnel costs. The problem with  user fees is that the lack of provisions to confer partial or
ful  waivers to the poor often results  in inequity in access to medical care. The dilemma,  then, is
how to make a much needed system of user fees compatible with the goal of preserving equitable
access to services.  Different countries  have tried different approaches.  Those which have carefully
designed and implemented  waiver systems (e.g., Thailand and  Indonesia) have  had much greater
success in terms of benefits incidence  than countries that have improvised such  systems (Ghana,
Kenya, Zimbabwe).  Key to the success of a waiver system  is its financing. Systems  that compensate
providers for the revenue forgone from granting exemptions (Thailand,  Indonesia,  and Cambodia)
have  been more successful  than those who expect the provider to absorb  the cost of exemptions
(Kenya).  Where waiver systems exist, performance will improve with the timeliness of the reimbursement.
Other success factors  include the widespread  dissemination of information  among potential
beneficiaries about waiver availability and procedures;  the awarding of financial support to  poor
patients for non-fee costs of care, such as food and transportation  (as  in Cambodia);  and the existence
of clear criteria for the granting of waivers,  thereby reducing confusion  and ambiguity among those
responsible for managing the system and among potential recipients. Those facing the task of adopting
a system  of waivers face multiple design options. These include the following, among others: should
exemptions be granted  to whole groups or on the basis of individual targeting (the  review finds that
mcist systems are  based on the latter)?  Should waivers or exemptions be permanent or temporary?
Hcw frequently should eligibility be reassessed?  Should waiver eligibility be determined ex-ante,
in  the household,  or when individuals seek care  in the facility? The review examines various
approaches taken  by countries,  but assessing their relative practical  merits is difficult, as  the evidence
is scattered and mixed
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